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Discriminatory Impact and Intent Under the
Equal Protection Clause: The Supreme Court
and the Mind-Body Problem
Marjorie J. Weinzweig*
Introduction
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979) was
the first sex discrimination case under the equal protection clause to turn
squarely on the issue of the discriminatory impact of a facially neutral
statute.' There, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a challenge to
Massachusetts' absolute veterans' preference for state civil service
positions. Previously, the Court had held that, absent the use of an
explicit racial category, discriminatory purpose or intent must be proved
in race discrimination claims under the equal protection clause.' Further,
discriminatory impact alone was not sufficient to invoke heightened
scrutiny, the stricter constitutional test that a facially neutral classifi-
cation can invoke. However, the Court said that discriminatory impact
can be an important element in proving discriminatory intent. I Justice
Stevens, concurring in Washington v. Davis, had suggested that the tort
rule which presumes a person to intend the natural, probable and
foreseeable consequences of his or her actions is relevant to the
* Marjorie J. Weinzweig is an attorney with Chain, Younger, Jameson, Lemucchi and
Noriega in Bakersfield, California. She was previously a professor of philosophy at
California State University, Fullerton, and Regional Attorney with the State of California
Public Employment Relations Board.
1. 442 U.S. 256 (1979) [hereinafter cited asFeeney]. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974) had raised the issue of whether the failure of a state disability insurance scheme to
include disability resulting from pregnancy violated the equal protection clause. The Court
held that the distinction between pregnant and non-pregnant persons is not a sex-based
classification, since the class of non-pregnant persons includes some women as well as all
men. Since this means that the distinction is not afacially gender-based distinction, the
Court should have gone on to consider the issue of the provision's discriminatory impact on
women. However, it did not do so.
2. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Davis]; Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Arlington Heights].
3. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242; Arlington Heights. 429 U.S. at 266.
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determination of discriminatory intent under the equal protection
clause.4
In addition to confronting the intent question, Feeney presented the
opportunity for elucidation of the Court's "intermediate" standard of
review for gender based distinctions' in the context of an ostensibly
"neutral" statute. Also, because the case turned on the challenged
statute's extreme and foreseeable impact on women's employment
opportunities in the state's civil service, Feeney raised the issue of
whether Justice Stevens' suggestion would prevail: whether the fore-
seeability of a statute's discriminatory impact is sufficient to prove
discriminatory purpose, especially when alternative measures were
available.
The Court rejected the argument that a discriminatory purpose was
established by the foreseeability of the statute's extreme disproportionate
impact on women, holding that discriminatory intent must be proven in
addition to discriminatory impact, although proof of discriminatory
impact might be one factor from which discriminatory purpose may be
inferred.
6
Part I of this article analyzes Feeney and criticizes the Court's rule
on philosophical grounds. It is suggested that in its articulation of the
Arlington Heights test, the Feeney Court regresses from a Wittgen-
steinian to a Cartesian conception of the relation between mental and
physical events. In so doing, it adopts a philosophically outdated and
inadequate view of the nature of human action and mental phenomena.
Part II assesses the significance of Feeney in light of both the recent
history of the Court's" motive" test and later developments in the Court's
use of this test. It is argued that, as a result of Feeney, the discriminatory
intent standard has been rendered virtually useless as a test of race and
gender discrimination. Finally, the article examines the appropriateness
of an "intent" requirement in equal protection cases.
1. The Feeney Decision
A. Internal Analysis
1. The Case Below
In Feeney, plaintiff challenged on equal protection grounds7 a
4. Davis, 426 U.S. at 253.
5. E.g., Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
6. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274.
7. The suit was filed under the equal protection clause of the Constitution rather than
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because Title VII contains an exemption for veterans'
preference statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-ll (1976).
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Massachusetts statute providing for an absolute lifetime preference for
veterans, their surviving spouses and their parents for all jobs in the
state's classified civil service.I Applicants were competitively scored on a
test and an "eligibles" list was drawn up of those who had passed.9
Disabled veterans, able-bodied veterans, and surviving spouses and
parents of veterans killed in action were ranked on three separate lists, in
order of their scores. 0 The names on each of these three lists were ranked
above all non-veterans." When a vacancy occurred, a list of "certified
eligibles" was drawn up consisting of the top several scores of the overall
ranking.' 2 One of these individuals, at the appointing authority's
discretion, would then be chosen for the job. 3 An eligible non-veteran
could never rank ahead of a veteran, no matter how much higher his or her
test score was.'4 The preference could be exercised an unlimited number
of times during a veteran's lifetime."
The statute's effect was that, during the period 1963-1973, fifty-
four percent of the men appointed to civil service jobs had veteran's
status, while only 1.8% of the women appointed were veterans.' While
forty-three percent of those appointed were women, a large percentage of
the women appointed served in lower grade, lower paying positions for
which males had traditionally not applied." In addition, some females
obtained their positions through a practice, since discontinued, of
requesting only females for certain jobs.'"
The district court noted that, while the statute's purposes were to
encourage service in the armed forces, reward those whose lives had been
disrupted by military service, and provide assistance during the transi-
tion from military to civilian life, 9 its negative impact on women was the
result of a number of federal statutes and regulations limiting the
opportunities for women to serve in the armed forces. Between 1948 and
1967, armed forces positions for women were limited to two percent of
total personneL. 0 At the time of the trial, the Army still maintained a two
percent limit." Between the end of World War I and 1942, only nurses
8. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259.




13. Id. at 263-64.
14. Id. at 263.
15. Id. at 262.
16. Id. at 270.
17. Id.
18. Anthony v. Commonwealth, 415 F. Supp. 485, 488 (D. Mass. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Anthony].
19. Id. at 496.




were allowed to enlist." In addition, until recently the enlistment criteria
for women were more stringent than those for men with respect to age,
parental consent, and mental and physical aptitude test scores."2 Women
were also required to undergo more extensive application and screening
procedures, including requirements for personal references and attrac-
tive appearance. 'Additionally, married women and women with minor
children were prohibited from enlisting.23
The district court concluded that the "practical consequence of the
operation of these federal military prescriptions in combination with the
veterans' preference formula is inescapable. . . . few, if any, women
will ever achieve a top position on a civil service eligibility list, for other
than positions traditionally held by women."216
Plaintiffs were three attorneys who had unsuccessfully sought
permanent civil service positions and Helen Feeney, a non-veteran who
had scored highly on the tests for several administrative positions but had
not been certified for the positions because of the preference. 2" Carol
Anthony's experience was typical of the three attorney plaintiffs:
Anthony was initially hired as a temporary attorney.2 8 When she took the
examination for the corresponding permanent position, she received (in a
tie with one other applicant) the highest score of any applicant.2 9 On the
eligibles list, however, Anthony ranked fifty-seventh, behind fifty-four
male veterans with scores lower than hers.30 Later, twenty more male
veterans were put on the eligibles list ahead of her, nineteen of whom had
scores lower than Anthony's.3
Helen Feeney received the second highest score on the exam for
Assistant Secretary of the Board of Dental Examiners in 1971, but was
ranked sixth behind five male veterans, four of whom had scores lower
than her score. 32 She was not certified and a male veteran with a lower
score got the position." In 1973, Feeney scored third on the exam for
Head Administrative Assistant at Solomon Mental Health Center, but
was ranked fourteenth behind twelve male veterans, eleven of whom had
lower scores. 34 She was not certified for the position.3" In 1974, Feeney
22. Id.
23. Id. at 489-90.
24. Id. at 490.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 490-92.
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scored seventeenth on an exam for Administrative Assistant positions but
was ranked seventieth, behind sixty-four veterans, sixty-three of whom
were male and fifty of whom had scores lower than hers."'
The district court rendered its first decision in 1976."1 Because
plaintiffs had sought an injunction against continued enforcement of the
statute, the case was heard by a three judge court.38 The district court held
that the claims of the three attorney-plaintiffs were moot because the
Massachusetts legislature in 1975 had removed all appointments for state
and municipal legal positions from the provisions of the state civil service
law. 3
In a 2-1 decision based on the statute's extremely burdensome
impact on women applicants, the district court found for Helen Feeney.'0
The court found it significant that the statute absolutely and permanently
prevented ninety-eight percent of the state's women from obtaining
significant civil service positions due to circumstances beyond their
control and unrelated to the objective assessment of job qualification."'
The court relied on the First Circuit's rule in Boston Chapter, NAACP v.
Beecher 2 and Castro v. Beecher,"3 that under the equal protection clause
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, if a job selection procedure has a
racially disproportionate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to
show that the means are substantially related to job performance. Under
such heightened scrutiny of the closeness of the "fit" between means and
ends, the availability of alternative means of rewarding veterans which
would not have such an absolute and permanent impact on women
applicants made the state's chosen means constitutionally impermissi-
ble." Such "less drastic" alternatives include a point preference or a time-
limited preference.' 5
36. Id.
37. Id. at 485.
38. 28 U.S.C. § § 2281, 2282, repealed by 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). Appeal of the district
court's ruling was therefore directly to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976). A
temporary restraining order had been issued prohibiting defendants from making or
preparing to make recommendations for the positions sought by plaintiffs, pending the
outcome of the litigation. Anthony, 415 F.Supp. at 487-88.
39. Anthony, 415 F.Supp. at 495. While the court did not give the reason for this
legislative change, it is reasonable to assume that it was related to the Anthony
litigation.
40. Id. at 499.
41. Id. at 496.
42. 504 F.2d 1017 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
43. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Castro]. These cases involved
actions under the equal protection clause because Title VII had been extended to cover
public employees only in 1972. In NAACPv. Beecher, the U.S. Attorney General had filed a
later action under Title VII. 504 F.2d at 1019.
44. Anthony, 415 F.Supp. at 499.
45. Id. Justice Murray, dissenting, would not have applied heightened scrutiny because
Law and Inequality
On appeal,46 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case to the district court for further consideration in light of its decision in
Davis."' In promulgating its rule that proof of discriminatory impact
alone is not sufficient to establish an equal protection violation because
discriminatory purpose or intent is required, the Davis Court had
specifically disapproved a number of circuit court cases holding that the
disproportionate racial impact of a statute or official practice was
sufficient to prove race discrimination violative of the equal protection
clause without regard to discriminatory purpose.48 Among these was
Castro, a case on which Anthony had relied.' 9
On remand, the district court reaffirmed,50 concluding that the
discrimination affected by the veterans' preference was intentional,"
under Davis and Arlington Heights.2 Judge Tauro's opinion focused on
Davis's suggestions that evidence of disproportionate impact is highly
relevant to the inference of discriminatory intent. 3
He also pointed to Justice Stevens' concurring statement in Davis
that
Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective
evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing
the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is
the statute was neutral on its face, setting up the classes of "veterans" and "non-veterans,"
where the latter class contained men as well as women. It was therefore "an even less
compelling claim for sex discrimination than Geduldig v. Aiello . . . where only women
were in the group burdened by the classification" (of pregnant and non-pregnant persons).
Id. at 504. Under the "rational basis" test, the statute would survive, since it has a worthy
purpose which it substantially serves. Id. at 507.
46. Following the district court's decision in Anthony. the Massachusetts Civil Service
Commission and the state personnel administrator, the defendants in the case, asked the
attorney general hot to appeal. Their request was joined by the governor. However, both
houses of the legislature passed resolutions urging appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The
attorney general then filed a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court, whereupon the
commission and the personnel administrator asked the Supreme Court to dismiss the
appeal because it was taken without their authorization and contrary to their request. The
Supreme Court certified the procedural question to the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
which held that the attorney general's action was consistent with his authority under state
law. Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 336 N.E.2d 1262 (1977).
47. 434 U.S. 884 (1977).
48. Davis, 426 U.S. at 244-4S.
49. Id. at 244 n. 12. The laundry list of disapproved cases also included Chance v.
Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2nd Cir. 1972) in which the Second Circuit had
adopted the same Title VII rule as did Castro.
50. Feeney v. Commonwealth, 451 F.Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978).
51. Id. at 149-50.
52. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). InArlington Heights, the Court reaffirmed and elaborated the
standard of Davis.
53. 451 F.Supp. at 146.
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presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds.
This is particularly true in the case of governmental action which is
frequently the product of compromise, of collective decision-
making, and of mixed motivation. 4
Judge Tauro's opinion distinguished between the statute's mo-
tive-to reward military service-and its intent." The means by which
the veterans' preference statute sought to achieve its motive of rewarding
veterans and the inevitability, foreseeability, and severity of its con-
sequences for women demonstrate that the statute's intent was to benefit
veterans at the expense of women. 6 Judge Tauro argued that the
Massachusetts legislature either knew, or should have known, of
regulations and policies limiting women's opportunities for military
service on the basis of criteria not relevant to women's fitness for civilian
service." He reasoned that the 1971 repeal of an exemption for certain
stereotypical "female jobs" showed that the legislature was aware of the
statute's discriminatory impact. 38 The existence of less drastic alternative
methods for aiding veterans 9 and the absence of any attempt to mitigate
the effects of the statute on women through affirmative action recruitment
programs, buttressed Judge Tauro's finding that the state had inten-
tionally sacrificed women's career opportunities."0 Finally, since it is not
necessary, according to Arlington Heights, to prove that the discrimina-
tory purpose was the sole or dominant purpose of the challenged
scheme," Judge Tauro concluded that the Davis-Arlington Heights test
was satisfied. 6
54. Davis, 426 U.S. at 253.
55. 451 F.Supp. at 150.
56. Id. at 146.
57. Id. at 148.
58. Id. at 148 n. 9. Judge Tauro brushed aside the dissent's contention that the "natural
and foreseeable consequences" test of intent was rejected by the Supreme Court when it
remanded U.S. v. Texas Education Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976) for recon-
sideration in the light of Davis and Arlington Heights. Id. at 147 n. 7. Justice Powell's
concurring opinion suggested that the Fifth Circuit may have "imput[ed] to school officials a
segregative intent far more pervasive than the evidence justified," Austin Independent
School District v. U.S.,429 U.S. 990,991 (1976), citing the court of appeals' statement that
school officials "may not constitutionally use a neighborhood assignment policy that creates
segregated schools in a district with ethnically segregated residential patterns" because "[a]
segregated school system is the foreseeable and inevitable result of such an assignment
policy." Id. at 991-92. Judge Tauro, however, refused to presume that the Supreme Court
used a remand order "to abrogate the basic principle that a person is deemed to intend the
natural, probable and foreseeable consequences of his actions." 451 F.Supp. at 147 n.
7.
59. 451 F.Supp. at 150.
60. Nor had there been any recent increase, as in Davis, in the percentage of women
appointed to civil service positions. Id. at 149.
61. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
62. 451 F.Supp. at 150.
1983]
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Judge Campbell, concurring, distinguished between the statute's
goals and its intent.63 The statute's goal was to aid veterans, but its intent
includes its inevitable consequences. While apparently a neutral measure
with merely incidental discriminatory impact, the inevitability and the
absoluteness of the statute's consequences belied that appearance. Since
ninety-eight percent of its preferred class was male, the statute's effect was
the same as if it were based on sex." When the discriminatory impact of a
statute is that certain, it cannot meaningfully be described as un-
intended. 6 Judge Campbell linked the means by which an intended goal
is effectuated with the intent of the legislature. Society may not aid
veterans at the cost of abolishing equal employment opportunities for
women where alternative methods are available" which would not force
one group to pay a disproportionate share of the cost. Examples of such
alternatives are tax supported contributions for veterans or a point
preference system.6 7
Judge Murray, dissenting, argued that the statute did not treat
similarly situated men and women differently because it disadvantaged a
large percentage of men as well as women . 6 Judge Murray rejected the
majority's tests for inferring intent from impact.69
For Judge Murray, intent means "motive" or "motivation" in the
sense of what "prompted passage of the law.'" 0 Foreseeability and the
legislature's actual awareness of the disproportionate impact are not
enough to prove intent under the Davis standard. Thus, for purposes of
the equal protection clause, inevitable consequences can be considered
unintended if they did notprompt the law's passage. Since plaintiff failed
to show that the veterans' preference statute would not have been enacted
but for its discriminatory effect on women, no showing of discriminatory
intent had been made. 1 Thus, the majority's version of the facts did not
conflict with Judge Murray's finding that the legislature perceived the
statute's impact on women as "extremely regrettable but unavoidable."
2
For Judge Murray, "motive" means the statute's desired result which
caused the legislature's action; while this result may entail discriminatory
effects, it is only the desired result, not the totality of the statute's effects,





68. Id. at 152.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 156.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 156 n. 9.
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which must pass constitutional muster.73
Judge Murray argued that the tort law presumption that a person
intends the natural foreseeable consequences of her actions does not
apply to scrutiny of state legislative action by the federal courts. 4
Principles of federalism require that states be permitted to experiment
with different solutions to social and economic problems without federal
interference; discriminatory motive should not inferred lightly in such
contexts." He concluded that unlawful intent may be inferred from
discriminatory impact only if the discriminatory impact, however
inevitable, constitutes a clear pattern unexplainable on non-discrimina-
tory grounds. 76
According to Judge Murray, this test is not met in Feeney. Even
accepting plaintiffs argument that military service is not related to job
performance (an argument which Judge Murray rejects), the preference
serves other legitimate goals besides that of obtaining qualified state
employees.77 There is no reason to believe that the legislature "departed
from usual considerations in enacting the preference,"7 " since there was
little absolute difference between the scores of those certified with the
veterans' preference and the scores that would have resulted without the
73. Judge Murray cited Justice Stewart's concurnng opinion in United Jewish Organiza-
tions v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Carey], in support of this
definition of "motive." 451 F.Supp. at 153 n. 3. In Carey, the Supreme Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to a race-conscious New York redistricting statute alleged to
contravene § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). In purposely creating
black majorities of a certain percentage in certain voting districts in Brooklyn, the statute
split the vote of the Hasidic Jews in the Williamsburgh area into two senate and two assembly
districts. 430 U.S. at 152. Concurring in the Court's rejection of the challenge, Justice
Stewart joined by Justice Powell applied the Davis and Arlington Heights test. Id. at 179.
They argued that the redistricting statute was not passed with the purpose of minimizing the
voting strength of a minority or of the white voters in the county, and pointed out that the
awareness of race on the part of the legislature when it drew up the statute did not equal
discriminatory intent. Id. at 180.
74. 451 F.Supp. at 155.
75. Id. Judge Murray cited Paul Brest's article, Palmer v. Thompson" An Approach to
the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 129-30, in
support of this point. This point is also made by Grace Blumberg, DeFacto andDeJureSex
Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: A Reconsideration of the Veterans'
Preference in Public Employment, 26 Buffalo L Rev. 1, 37 (1977) and was noted in
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n. 25.
76. As examples of such a"clear pattern," Judge Murray cited Yick Wov. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886); and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (invalidating a state act
which changed the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama from a square shape to a twenty-eight
sided figure, eliminating nearly all black voters from the city).
77. 451 F.Supp. at 154.
78. Id. at 155-56. Judge Murray here cites Brest, supra note 75, at 121-22. Professor
Brest explained one form of inference of discriminatory motive: when the decisionmaker
failed to consider such factors as the costs of a proposal, its conduciveness to the ends
Law and Inequality
preference. 9 Thus, there was no reason to believe that the veterans'
preference operated to lower the quality of the employee pool.
To Judge Tauro's and Judge Campbell's emphasis on the availa-
bility of less restrictive alternatives, Judge Murray responded that
modifying the preference would also reduce its effectiveness.80 Thus, the
preference's absoluteness does not demonstrate discriminatory intent,
but rather that proper motives underlay the statute.8"
Finally, Judge Murray noted that three veterans' preference
statutes had been upheld against an equal protection challenge after
Davis." While all three courts distinguished Anthony as involving a
stronger discriminatory impact on women than the statutes at issue, one
court noted that the impact approach used inAnthony had been rejected
in Davis."3 And in all three cases the courts found no intent to harm
women.
8 4
sought, or the availability of less costly alternatives to the community as a whole or to a
particular segment of the community. In such cases the decision does not appear rational or
even marginally meritorious in its own right. Gomillion is again the paradigm. There is
reason to believe that the veterans' preference wouldfail Brest's test, since alternatives less
costly to the female segment of the community are available and the legislature does not
seem to have considered them.
79. 451 F.Supp. at 155 n. 8. The test scores cited support Judge Murray's point for only
one of the three positions applied for by Feeney.
80. Id. at 156.
81. Id.
82. Bannerman v. Department of Youth Authority, 436 F.Supp. 1273 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
[hereinafter cited asBannerman]; Branch v. Du Bois, 418 F.Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Branch]; and Ballou v. State Dept. of Civil Service, 148 N.J. Super.
112, 372 A. 2d 333 (1977), affd, 75 N.J. 365, 382 A.2d 1118 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Ballou].
83. Bannerman, 436 F.Supp. at 1280.
84. Branch and Bannerman involved equal protection challenges to veterans' prefer-
ence provisions which awarded additional points to veterans' scores on interviews or exams.
Bannerman, 436 F.Supp. at 1275: Branch, 418 F.Supp. at 1130. Both cases distinguished
Anthony in that they did not involve an absolute statutory preference. 436 F.Supp. at 1281,
418 F.Supp. at 1132. InBallou, New Jersey's veterans' preference system was challenged.
148 N.J. Super. at 119,372 A.2d at335-36. Thefacts were striking- plaintiff scored 99.999,
the highest score among applicants for the position of Coordinator of Federal and Social
Programs in the Division of Consumer Affairs, a position which she had held on a temporary
basis for three years. The next highest score was 82.500. Since the recipient of that score was
a veteran, his appointment was mandatory. Plaintiff had developed and directed the
Consumer Affairs Social Assistance Program from its inception. In order to ensure
continuity she was appointed "Confidential Agent" at her previous salary. Many of the
duties of the permanent position were then assigned to her rather than to the veteran who
took her old position. Id. at 115-16, 372 A.2d at 334. The court of appeals initially
remanded the case to the state Civil Service Commission for a plenary hearing giving
"careful examination" to the "detailed facts and circumstances" concerning the manner in
which the statutory preference had operated and its effects on civil service appointment. Id.
at 116, 372 A.2d at 335. The Commission found that the absolute preference system, by
[Vol. 1:277
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2. The Supreme Court Decision
a. Majority Opinion
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's holding
and upheld the constitutionality of the Massachusetts veterans' prefer-
ence statute. Justice Stewart's majority opinion extended the Davis-
Arlington Heights rule to claims of gender-based discrimination.s The
Court held that a facially neutral law which adversely and dispropor-
tionately affects women is unconstitutional under the equal protection
clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose. 6
Further, the Court will apply the heightened scrutiny of its "substantial
relationship" test, a test the Court has found appropriate for non-neutral,
gender-based classifications, only if a discriminatory purpose is
shown. 7
According to Justice Stewart, any challenge of a facially gender-
neutral statute on grounds of disproportionate adverse impact entails a
two-step inquiry. First, the Court must determine that the statutory
classification is really neutral, and not overtly or covertly based on
gender. Next, if the statute is neutral, the Court must determine whether
the adverse effect "reflects invidious gender-based discrimination;" that
is, whether it necessarily implies discriminatory purpose or moti-
vation.8
which any veteran who passes the exam is "floated to the top of the list." discriminates
excessively in basing treatment on factors other than merit, and "has had a distorting,
depressing and adverse effect" on civil service appointments and on the merit system of
appointments to classified positions. Id. Nevertheless, the court then distinguished
Anthony on the grounds that Ballou had not shown "'near blanket permanent exclusion of
all women from a major sector of employment"' and because the Civil Service Commission
had not found "sufficient evidence to prove that women are discriminated against by the
veterans' preference to any substantially greater degree than are all non-veterans." Id. at
123-24, 372 A.2d at 339. Therefore plaintiff's rights to relief rested on her membership in
the class of "non-veterans" and not in the class of "women," and only the "rational basis"
test applied. In addition, the appellate court applied the Davis rule and held that
disproportionate impact was not sufficient to invoke a heightened level of review where there
was no claim of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 125-26, 372 A.2d at 339. The New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed, pointing to the U.S. Supreme Court's remand ofAnthony in light
of Davis as indicating that the appellate court had anticipated the correct legal standard. 75
N.J. 365, 372; 382 A.2d 1118, 1121 (1978).
85. Davis and Arlington Heights both involved claims of racial discrimination.
86. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274.
87. Id. at 272-73.
88. Id. at 274. The first step in the inquiry presumably determines whether the
ostensibly neutral classification is apretext for invidious gender based discrimination; the
second step determines whether the purpose of the classification is invidious discrimina-
tion. Justice Stevens, concurring, questioned whether there is any difference between these
two inquiries. Id. at 281. Justice Stevens was correct in raising this question. If the statutory
classification appears neutral but is really a pretext for invidious discrimination, then what
Law and Inequality
Justice Stewart agreed with Judge Murray's dissenting opinion in
rejecting the district court's "foreseeable consequences" test of dis-
criminatory intent.8 9 Discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. "It implies that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action
at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group." 90 That is, the discriminatory effect must have been
"a collateral goal"9 1-one of the reasons for the action. In this context,
Justice Stewart maintained that proof of discriminatory intent "must
necessarily usually rely on objective factors, several of which were
outlined in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.
. . .What a legislature . . . is'up to' maybe plain from the results its
actions achieve. . . . .9 It is clear, however, that these "objective
factors" are of concern only as signs or symptoms of the purpose or
desired end. They are not the purpose itself, nor are they in any sense
constitutive of the purpose.
Thus, in determining whether the state acted because of the
discriminatory consequences, disproportionate impact provides an
important starting point. A strong inference can be drawn from dis-
proportionate impact, namely, that the statute's results were desired.
"But in this inquiry . . . an inference is a working tool, not a synonym
for proof;" that inference "fails to ripen into proof' if the impact is an
unavoidable consequence of a legislative policy always deemed legiti-
mate, and if all other evidence shows that the statute's discriminatory
impact was not its purpose.93
The Massachusetts veterans' preference statute, to the Feeney
Court, presents such a case. The statute itself is facially neutral; it defines
"veteran" in gender neutral language. Since the class of "non-veterans"
contains a large percentage of men, the statute's operation cannot be
explained on grounds of gender-based discrimination. Therefore, unlike
has happened is that a facially neutral classification has been promulgated with a covert
discriminatory purpose. The Court's language as it began to apply the test shows that the two
inquiries cannot be separated. Having established that the distinction between veterans and
non-veterans is not a pretext for gender discrimination, the Court went on to make the
following statement: "If the impact of this statute could not be plausibly explained on a
neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made by the law was in
fact not neutral." Id. at 275. Determining non-neutrality was supposed to be thefirst step of
the inquiry. However, determining whether the impact of a statute has a non-neutral
explanation is the test for invidiouspurpose- the purported second step.
89. Not surprisingly, Justice Stewart cited his concurrence in Carey, on which Judge
Murray had based his dissent. See supra note 73.
90. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 279 n. 24.
93. Id. at 279 n. 25.
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Yick Wo v. Hopkins,9" the veterans' preference was not enacted as a
pretext for gender-based discrimination. Instead, explanation of the
statute's impact lay in its stated purposes. The distinction underlying the
statute was not really a distinction between men and women, but between
veterans and non-veterans. 9S
The Court acknowledged that military enlistment policies "may
well have" discriminated on the basis of sex, citing Frontiero v.
Richardson9 and Schlesinger v. Ballard.9" The significance of this fact,
however, was brushed aside with the statement that "the history of
discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in this case."9'
The Court restricted the scope of historical and social inquiry in
determining legislative intent. The statute was thus circumscribed, the
Court dismissing as irrelevant to the issue of discriminatory intent factors
making up the context in which it was passed and has operated, focusing
only on its expressed legislative history. An examination of that
expressed history revealed that the statute was not enacted and re-enacted
for the purpose of keeping women in stereotyped, pre-defined civil
service jobs; it was always extended to "any person" who was a veteran."
94. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
95. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275-76. Although this argument sounds reasonable, the same
argument was made in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), see supra note 1, where the
disadvantaged class was of necessity exclusively female. To buttress this argument the
Court stressed the district court's initial finding, reaffirmed on remand, that the statute
served legitimate and worthy purposes, and that the absolute preference was not established
for the purpose of discriminating against women. 442 U.S. at 276-77. In addition, the Court
follows Judge Murray in turning around the district court majority's arguments that the
availability of a less burdensome form of preference showed that the state intentionally
discriminated against women in bringing about the more burdensome impact. According to
Justice Stewart, " [d] iscriminatory intent is simply not amenable to calibration. It either is a
factor that has influenced the legislative choice or it is not." Id. at 277. Thus plaintiffs
admission that a more limited preference could be sustained defeats her claim regarding the
state's intentional incorporation of the historical gender-based military personnel practices
into state employment policies. Id. at 276. If the state so acted intentionally, the degree of
preference would make no consitutional difference. Intent is here conceived of as the kind of
state of affairs which does not admit of degrees. It is "all or nothing"-either the legislature
had it or it did not. One example of such a state of affairs is an event, which either occurs or
does not.
96. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (the armed forces required female members to show that their
spouses were dependent to obtain living allowances and benefits, but spouses of male
members of the armed forces were assumed to be dependent).
97. 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (differential treatment of male and female officers under the
"up or out" policy was designed to compensate for limitations on professional opportunities
for women in armed forces).
98. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278.
99. The Court pointed out that shortly after the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps
(WAAC) was founded in 1942, the preference was extended to members of the WAAC, as
well as to women serving in official military units by means of a broad definition of
"veteran." Id. at 279 n. 26, 268 n. 17.
1983]
Law and Inequality
The Court dismissed plaintiff's argument that a former statutory
exemption for "women's requisitions" demonstrated discriminatory
intent on the part of the state legislature with a reference to the "consistent
statutory recognition of the contribution of women to this Nation's
military efforts."'0
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White, concurred on the ground
that, whether the claim of discrimination is phrased in terms of "pretext"
or in terms of "discriminatory intent," the large number of males
disadvantaged by the statute was sufficient to disprove invidious gender-
based discrimination.'0 ' He did not comment on the majority's rejection
of the "foreseeable consequences" test of intent advanced in his own
concurring opinion in Davis.°2
b. Dissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, rejected the Court's
test for discriminatory intent. Without rejecting the Court's requirement
of proof of a causal relationship between the injury and discriminatory
intent or purpose, Justice Marshall proposed different rules of inference
to discriminatory purpose from discriminatory impact.' 03
Justice Marshall began by reminding the majority that the illegiti-
mate purpose need not be the sole or dominant purpose of the challenged
statute, but rather need only have played "an appreciable role in shaping
the legislative enactment.""' Thus, the fact that a legislature intended to
benefit one group does not foreclose equal protection analysis; it is
enought that the legislature also intended to disadvantage another
group.
Justice Marshall stressed the need for objective indicia of intent. 101
Factors mentioned in the Court's earlier decisions include the degree,
inevitability and foreseeability of the disproportionate impact, and the
availability of reasonable alternatives. 106 Where the foreseeably dis-
100. Id. at 280 n. 27. The Court also brushed aside the district court majority's
argument that the statute was overtly non-neutral since it established the job preference on
the basis of a non-job-related characteristic. This claim was disposed of with a reiteration of
the district court's finding that the legislative choice was "legitimate" because its goals were
"worthy." Id. at 276. See also Blumberg, supra note 75, at 60.
101. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281.
102. Davis, 426 U.S. at 252-53.
103. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 283.
104. Id. at 282. Justice Marshall here cited the rule of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at
265-66, and Professor Ely's article, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 Yale LJ. 1205 (1970).
105. Justice Marshall cited United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as O'Brien] and Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Palmer], as preceding Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the difficulty of ascertaining
subjective intent. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 283.
106. For cases applying these factors, see Goss v. Board of Education 373 U.S. 683
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proportionate impact is as great as in the present case and is the result of a
"long history of policies severely limiting women's participation in the
military," Marshall argued, the burden should rest on the state to show
that sex-based considerations played no part in the choice of the
challenged legislative scheme.10 7 Shifting the burden of proof is parti-
cularly appropriate here because the degree, inevitability and foresee-
ability of the disproportionate impact demonstrates that the statute is
neutral in form only, and not in application, because it reserves a major
sector of public employment " 'to an already established class which, as a
matter of historical fact, is ninety-eight percent male.' "1
The state, in his assessment, did not meet this burden of demon-
strating that sex-based considerations did not determine its choice of
legislative scheme.' 09 The legislative history suggests that the legislature
was aware of the statute's adverse impact on women but, except for
traditionally "female" jobs, declined to mitigate it. The exemption for
jobs " 'especially calling for women' " was an essential part of the
veterans' preference scheme and operated in conjunction with the
absolute preference to create a gender-based, civil service hierarchy in
which women workers were relegated to traditionally "female" occupa-
tions." 0 The preference scheme thus both reflects and perpetuates
archaic assumptions about women's roles, assumptions which the Court
has held invalid in previous sex discrimination decisions."'
The severe impact of the statute on women's public employment
opportunities, particularly in light of the less discriminatory alternatives
available, implies that the statute is not gender neutral." 2 Justice
Marshall noted that only four states other than Massachusetts have an
absolute veterans' preference. The other states, along with the federal
government, grant only point or tie-breaking preferences which do not
foreclose opportunities for women. "' Justice Marshall concluded that the
majority "displays a singularly myopic view of the facts established
below" in maintaining that" 'nothing in the record' evinces a 'collateral
(1963); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Gomilion v. Lightfoot.
364 U.S. 339 (1960); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
107. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 283-84.
108. Id. at 284, citing Judge Campbell's concurrence inFeeney v. Commonwealth, 451
F.Supp. at 150.
109. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 284.
110. Id. at 284-85.
111. Id. at 285. Justice Marshall cited as examples Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
112. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 285.
113. Id. at 282 n. 2.
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goal' "of keeping women in stereotyped roles in the state civil service."'
Nor is the percentage of males disadvantaged by the statute dispositive as
to its neutrality: while forty-seven percent of men over eighteen are
veterans, only .8% of women in that age group are veterans. 'I
Justice Marshall argued that, where a statutory scheme visits a
substantial hardship on a class long subject to discrimination, it "cannot
be sustained unless 'carefully tuned to alternative considerations.' "6
Marshall's requirements that statutory classifications be narrowly tai-
lored to fit the statute's objectives and that no less discriminatory
alternative be available suggest a heightened level of scrutiny."' The
veterans' preference statute fails to meet this heightened standard of
review. The means adopted by the legislature are not substantially related
to the statute's stated objectives of assisting veterans in readjusting to
civilian life, encouraging enlistment, and rewarding military service. 1 8
Justice Marshall argued that, with respect to the first two stated
objectives, the statute is overbroad. It allows veterans to exercise the
preference repeatedly and without regard to their date of discharge, thus
overreaching the goal of assisting veterans' readjustment." '9 The pre-
ference is also overbroad with respect to the goal of encouraging military
service; it benefits draftees as well as enlistees and was generally enacted
and re-enacted retroactively to benefit those who had already served.
Further, the state presented no proof that the possibility of obtaining civil
service jobs actually encourages enlistment. 10
The third statutory purpose-rewarding veterans-could be ac-
complished by alternatives with fewer discriminatory consequences.
Many of these alternatives-educational subsidies, tax abatements and
special programs for needy veterans, for example-would involve costs
borne by the general public rather than by one discrete group long subject
to discrimination.'' Thus, as with the first two objectives, the third state
interest "does not 'adequately justify the salient features' " of the
preference system."'
114. Id. at 285-86.
115. Id. at 286 n. 3.
116. Id. at 287.
117. G. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfora AewerEqual Protection, 86 Harv. L Rev. 1,
20-24 (1972).
118. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 286.
119. Id. at 286-87.
120. Id. at 287.
121. Id. at 287-88.
122. Id. at 287, citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202-03 (1976).
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c. Conclusion
The Supreme Court majority in Feeney adopted Judge Murray's
restrictive view of how discriminatory intent may be inferred from
disproportionate impact. This view holds that proof that the discrimina-
tory impact was a desired end which motivated the legislative or official
action is required. The dissent adopted the views of Judges Tauro and
Campbell, holding that the severity, inevitability and foreseeability of the
discriminatory impact, together with the history of past official discrimi-
nation against women and the availability of less discriminatory means of
achieving the statute's objectives, demonstrate discriminatory intent.
The majority and dissenting viewpoints diverge on how broadly the
context of the challenged actions should be examined as evidence for
discriminatory intent and the relations between "objective" factors and
intent. As to the former divergence of opinion, the district court majority
and the Supreme Court dissenters consider governmental restrictions on
women in the military as evidence that the preference statute's impact on
women was intentional. The Supreme Court majority and the district
court dissent, on the other hand, maintain that the history of gender-
based discrimination in the military is "not on trial" in Feeney.'23
Similarly, for the district court majority and Supreme Court dissenters,
the availability of less burdensome alternatives is relevant to proof of
intent, while for the Supreme Court majority and Judge Murray it is not.
The latter scrutinize state action to determine intent without regard to less
burdensome alternatives; the consequences of the action itself, no matter
how severe, inevitable, foreseeable or foreseen, are not relevant to the
intent determination once it is established that the legislature was aiming
at something else when it enacted the statute.
The fundamental issue here is how the challenged state action is to
be characterized: what is it that we say the state did? Do the means chosen
by the state to achieve its goals and the inevitable consequences of those
means enter into the characterization of the challenged action? Does the
history of state action with respect to the affected group make a difference
as to how we characterize what was done? While the Supreme Court
dissenters defined the challenged state action broadly, the majority
viewed it through a narrower frame, one which obliterates much of the
surrounding context.
The second divergence of opinion involves the relation between
"objective" factors shaping the context in which the challenged state
action occurs and the "motive," "purpose," or "intent" underlying that
action. The Supreme Court majority viewed intent as an event separate
from, and not necessarily to be implied from, "objective" factors such as
the statute's impact on a particulargroup or the history of state action with
123. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278.
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respect to that group. In the majority's view, such factors are at most
"signs" or "symptoms" of discriminatory intent. A separate, additional
inference is required to establish the existence and nature of the intent
itself. No connection necessarily exists between the symptoms and the
true subjective event-the intent: the intent might not be discrminatory
no matter how strong the evidence of discrimination provided by the
symptoms.
Justice Marshall, on the other hand, saw a necessary relation
between objective factors, such as impact and historical context, and
legislative intent. In Marshall's view, objective factors constitute intent.
They are demonstrative of legislative intent such that, if enough objective
evidence is available, it does not make sense to say that state action is
nevertheless taken without discriminatory purpose or motivation.'"
While the majority opinions in Davis and Arlington Heights seem
to reflect Justice Marshall's approach to the relation between objective
evidence and intent, Feeney represents a move by the Court toward
viewing intent as a separate, subjective event not logically related to
objective factors.
B. Internal Critique of Feeney
1. The Nature of "Mental" Phenomefta: Regression to
Cartesianism
What kind of thing are we looking for when we look for evidence of
"intent,. "purpose' or "motive"?' 25 The Court's question in Feeney-
namely, what kind of evidence is relevant to the truth of statements about
"purpose," "intent" and "motive" and in what way is that evidence
relevant?-implies an answer to the former question. In selecting
"intent" as the test for an equal protection violation in cases where the
alleged discrimination is not official, the Supreme Court has become
mired in an ancient and extremely troublesome philosophical question:
the relation between mind and body, between mental and physical
phenomena.
In the fourth century B.C., Plato propounded the view of the mind
or soul as an entity separate from the body which it inhabits and capable
of existence independent of the body. Plato felt that the highest kind of
knowledge is acquired when the mind operates independently of the
body. In Plato's view, learning consists in the recollection of knowledge
acquired in a previous state in which the mind existed separately from the
body. 2 6 This doctrine formed the basis for the Christian conception of the
124. L Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, ## 50-51, 53-54, 66-73
(1966).
125. For a discussion of the differences in denotation of these terms see text accompany-
ing notes 154-76.
126. Plato, Republic, Books V-VII; Phaedo 62E-84D.
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immortality of the soul.'
While Plato's disciple, Aristotle, rejected this mind-body dualism,
believing that mind or form exists only in and in relation to body or
matter, 2 ' it was revived in the seventeenth century by Descartes, the
founder of modern philosophy. Descartes embarked on a broad program
of rebuilding all human knowledge on the model of modem science,
starting with a foundation of absolutely certain knowledge and progress-
ing by a series of logically necessary steps. To establish the "foundation"
or indubitable first premise, Descartes invented the method of "Cartesian
doubt": nothing will be accepted as known if there are any grounds on
which it conceivably can be doubted.1
2 9
Descartes found that he could doubt the existence of the entire
physical world including his own body, mathematical truths, God, and
other persons. He could not doubt, however, that his mind was engaged in
doubting during the inquiry. Thus, according to Descartes, the existence
of his own thoughts and experiences was indubitable or absolutely
certain. The "foundation stone" thus became the existence of mental
phenomena meaning events such as thoughts and feelings and a mental
"substance" or entity which has or is the subject of those thoughts and
feelings. 130
Our certainty that our own thoughts and feelings exist does not
imply, however, that we can be certain that anyphysical event or entity
exists. Since the existence of body thus is not implied by the existence of
mind, mind and body are two logically separate substances having
nothing in common with one another. Further, the best knowledge we can
have is knowledge of our subjective, inner mental states. The knowledge
which we can have of the external world is far less immediate and more
tenuous than our knowledge of our own thoughts and feelings.' 3 '
This "mind-body dualism," which shaped philosophical and social
scientific thought from the time of Descartes until the mid-twentieth
century, leaves the epistemologist and the social scientist with three
127. See, e.g., Romans 8:5-13.
128. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Books IX, XII; De Anima. There is one exception to this
principle: the "prime mover," or pure thought. While this object is the highest object in the
universe, and moves all things by being the object of desire, without matter it can have no
definite nature or content. It thus does not play an important role in Aristotle's account of
individual living things such as man.
129. Descartes, Meditations (1644), and Discourse on Method (1637).
130. Id.
131. Indeed, Descartes was able to prove the existence of physical substance only by first
using additional unproven premises to prove the existence of God as a benevolent, all
powerful being, and then arguing that a benevolent God would not deceive us by giving us a
strong natural inclination to believe that body exists as the cause of our sensations




First, the problem of solipsism: how is it possible to infer the
existence of objective events in the external world from the existence of
the thinker's subjective mental states?'
Second, the problem of "other minds": an individual in principle
cannot know the thoughts and feelings of another person in the way she
knows her own. We have immediate, indubitable knowledge of our own
inner experiences, but our knowledge of other persons' inner experiences
must be inferred from their behavior and their bodies. Even assuming we
can know of the existence of another person's body, however, we must
make a further, highly questionable inference from such knowledge to
assumptions about the subjective thoughts and feelings accompanying
her physical existence. This inference necessarily must proceed by
analogy from our knowledge of our own thoughts and feelings and from
our observations of the events in our own bodies accompanying those
thoughts and feelings.' But that analogy is extremely weak; I can never
experience another person's mental states. The inference is thus unlike
the "standard" type of empirical inference in which, for example, an
electrical worker who on many occasions has opened up metal boxes of a
certain size with certain exterior markings and found them to contain a
certain type of fuse has good grounds for assuming that another metal
box, identical to those she has opened in the past will have a fuse like those
in the boxes she has previously opened.'34
Third, the problem of mind-body interaction: since mind and body
have nothing in common and since the existence of a mental event does
not imply the existence of any physical events, how is it possible for them
causally to interact? A related problem involves the distinction between
reasons and causes: events in the physical world, including events in our
bodies and some of our behavior, are caused. That is, external factors
operating on the physical object make the event happen; its occurrence
could be predicted from an accurate knowledge of these causal factors.
Our reasons, purposes, and goals, however, do not seem to cause our
behavior in the same way as do drugs, alcohol, blind emotions, hormones
or enzymes. We hold individuals accountable for their actions just insofar
as they act "purposively": i.e., in pursuit of goals and purposes which
they have adopted for "reasons." We tend to excuse behavior that is
132. It is not possible. See, e.g., H.H. Price, Perception (1932); A.J. Aver, The
Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940); C.O. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in
Nature, Chapter IV (1960); B. Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, Part
Three (1948); C.I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Chapters II-IX
(1946).
133. See, e.g., A.J. Ayer, One's Knowledge of Other Minds, in Philosophical Essays
(1954).
134. L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ## 293-304 (1953).
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attributable to causes which are not the product of purposive reasoning,
particularly where those causes are external to the individual. The
Supreme Court's use of "motivation" to mean "cause," as well as
meaning "motive" and "purpose," obscures this important distinction
between "reasons" and "causes." 13 5
Until recently, the only way out of these three philosophical
dilemmas which result from Cartesian dualism was to reduce one of the
two kinds of events-mental and physical-to the other. The version of
reductionism most appropriate for social scientists is "physicalism" or
"behaviorism" which reduces mental events to their physical con-
comitants. 136 When a mental event such as anger, for example, is
redefined in terms of physiological reactions and observable behavior,
the problem of justifying an inference from physical events to an "inner,
mental" event of which the external observer can have no direct
experience disappears. Similarly, there is no longer any problem
explaining how mind and body can interact, since mind is now the same
kind of thing as body.
Such reductionist views, however, are implausible. Our thoughts
and feelings obviously are not identical to the behavior and physiological
changes which accompany them. For example, a person may talk and act
just like a Black Panther but, if he is really an FBI spy, he knows that he
really abhors Black Panther political principles no matter how enthusias-
tically he pretends to espouse them, even if his behavior is accompanied
by physiological changes exactly like those accompanying a Panther's
emotions.
Recent philosophy has attempted to rethink the concept of mental
phenomena as necessarily connected to or inseparable from physical
phenomena without identifying orreducing the mental to the physical or
vice versa. In the Anglo-American "analytic" tradition, this work derives
135. See e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66. This confusion did not originate
with the Supreme Court, however. The concept of "motivation" is a touchstone of
psychological theory. "Motivation: An intervening variable which is used to account for
factors within the organism which arouse, maintain, and channel behavior toward a goal."
Chaplin, Dictionary of Psychology, 325-26 (1975). "Motivation" in psychology is a broad
term encompassing whatever causes our actions, whether it is bodily tensions such as
physical desires or our conscious reasons.
136. See, e.g., D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (1968); J. O'Connor,
Modern Materialism (1969); R Carnap, The Unity of Science (1934). Another version of
reductionism, following Descartes' view of the primacy of our knowledge of our own sense
impressions, reduces the physical to the mental. See, e.g., G. Berkeley, Three Dialogues
Between Hylas and Philonous (1713); A. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge
(1940). This view, however, while popular with the "radical empiricists" of the early
twentieth century such as Bertrand Russell (see, e.g., B. Russell, Our Knowledge of the




from the later writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, especially the Philosophi-
cal Investigations.' 7 Wittgenstein analyzed first person psychological
statements, not as referring to isolated mental events, but rather as both
manifesting and serving to establish an essential connection between the
mental event and the context in which that mental event occurs. For
example, Wittgenstein considered statements such as "My head hurts,"
and "I understand," said by a student of mathematics. He rejected the
suggestion that "headache" and "understanding" refer to private mental
states which exist independently of the inter-subjective social context in
which the language is used. Instead, "understanding" is essentially
connected with the speaker's ability to fill in the next term of mathe-
matical series according to the correct rule or ability to prove the
theorem,' 8 while the"verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does
not describe it."' 1 9 Wittgenstein did not deny the existence of subjective
thoughts and feelings; instead, his point was that subjective thoughts and
feelings exist only in a certain inter-subjective socio-physical context
which is constitutive of their identity. This context includes the ex-
periencer's body-regarded as not just an inert physical object, but as the
basis for the things we do-and other people with bodies like ours in
relation to whom we do things according to social conventions or rules.
Language, for Wittgenstein, involves such a set of social rules; he called
the total context in which people interact through language a "form of
life." 0
A recent law review note"' advocated a Wittgensteinian interpre-
tation of the "segregative intent" requirement in school segregation cases.
Such an interpretation would provide an intermediate standard between
"subjective intent," which refers to the subjective desires of individual
government officials or legislators for segregation, and "objective intent,"
137. L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953). In the Continental tradition
this theme is prominent in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty. See Husseri, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, ##84-87, 90
(1931); Cartesian Meditations, ## 11, 14, 15 (1960); Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception, 98-345 (1962). Weinzweig, Phenomenology and Ordinary Language
Philosophy, 8 Metaphilosophy 116, 119-21, 135-37 (1977). In Husser's conception of
consciousness as "intentional" each mental event is by its very nature directed to a
transcendent object, given on the background of the spatio- temporal-social context in which
we live: the world. In this way the mental and the external world are inextricably linked. For
Merleau- Ponty, who adopts Husserrs theory of consciousness as intentional, consciousness
itself is embodied: the body is the instrument through which consciousness directs itself to
the world.
138. Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at ##143-54, 185-214, 578-80.
139. Id. at 9# 244, 256. 271, 288.
140. See, e.g., id. at ##23-24, 572-73, 581-84.
141. Note, Reading the Mind of the School Boarc" Segregative Intent and the De Facto
De Jure Distinction, 86 Yale LJ. 317 (1976).
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which defines intent as the foreseeable consequences of an action. This
intermediate standard would scrutinize the motives of institutions rather
than those of individual lawmakers or officials. It would include an
analysis of patterns of behavior by the institution to determine whether
the challenged action can be justified in terms of the institution's usual
objectives and considerations. Segregative intent would mean "acting as
if':
If it can be demonstrated that the educational objectives of the
school board could have been better accomplished through alterna-
tives with less foreseeable segregative impact, the school board will
be held to have acted "as if" segregation had been one of its
purposes, and the consequent racial imbalance will be held to have
resulted from "segregative intent." 42
Rather than trying to ascertain the events taking place inside the minds of
school administrators and school board members, courts would evaluate
the "effect of and justifications for school board actions." ''  Since
motivation is essentially connected to the actor's behavior in a given
context, it is not necessary or relevant to attempt to proceed from evidence
of behavior to proof of intent as a private inner event in the mind of the
actor of which the behavior is only an external sign. This approach is
consistent with the rules articulated by the Supreme Court inArlington
Heights and with its reasonings in cases such as White v. Regester".
In Feeney, however, the Court retreated to the Cartesian con-
ception of "motive," "purpose," and "intent" with its attendant diffi-
culties of proof and application. '4S While the rules for inferring dis-
criminatory purpose or intent articulated in Davis andArlington Heights
seemed to suggest a Wittgensteinian approach according to which the
relevant mental state is essentially connected to objective factors in the
social and historical context of the action, Feeney holds that proof of
discriminatory impact, no matter how inevitable and immediate, is at best
only a first step in proving discriminatory motive. A plaintiff must also
142. Id. at 338.
143. Id. at 342-43.
144. 412 U.S. 755 (1973) [hereinafter cited as White]. See also G. Mac Callum,
Legislative Intent, 75 Yale LJ. 754,784-85 (1966). Mac Callum analyzes legislative intent
as a social institution in which legislators are aware that the courts will interpret their actions
according to certain "canons" of legislative intent. They can thus act with reference to those
canons in order to influence by their behavior "what the intentions of the legislature can
reasonably be said to be." Id. at 785.
145. These difficulties, however, may in fact constitute the Court's "motive" for its
choice of rule: if a rule is adopted under which it is very difficult to. prove discriminatory
motive and thus invoke heightened scrutiny, the equal protection clause will not often be
used to invalidate state action. See, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 782-84 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) [hereinafter cited as Trimble].
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prove the -existence of something else: the mental occurrence (the
"desire") which caused the action.
A Wittgensteinian approach is not only far more satisfactory
philosophically in making possible an adequate account of the nature of
mental phenomena; it also provides a test which is more workable
politically. Under the Wittgensteinian approach proof of objective factors
can settle the issue of intent. Under the Feeney-Cartesian conception, on
the other hand, it is apparently impossible to prove discriminatory intent
since it is in principle impossible to know what is going on in another
person's mind. Adoption of the Feeney standard as a necessary condition
for finding an equal protection violation is therefore highly unlikely to
result in findings of discrimination.
2. The Doctrine of the "Double Effect"
Feeney's "desired result"/"but for cause" test of intent revives the
discredited "doctrine of the double effect" central to the Catholic
Church's traditional abortion doctrine. According to the doctrine of the
double effect, it may be morally permissible to bring about an effect which
is "foreseen but in no way desired" where it would not be morally
permissible to bring about the same effect as the aimed-at result of the
action. The philosopher Philippa Foot explains the doctrine as follows:
The doctrine of the double effect is based on a distinction between
what a man foresees as a result of his voluntary action, and what, in
the strict sense, he intends. He intends in the strictest sense both
those things that he aims at as ends and those that he aims at as
means to his ends. . . . By contrast a man is said not strictly, or
directly, to intend the foreseen consequences of his voluntary
actions where these are neither the end at which he is aiming nor the
means to this end. 46
Thus, for example, a hysterectomy which has the inevitable result of
killing the fetus is permissible because the death of the fetus is neither the
end at which one is aiming nor the means to that end. A craniotomy
performed during childbirth is not permissible, however, because it aims
at the death of the child in order to save the mother.
The philosopher Kant drew a similar distinction in explaining why
it is wrong to lie even where telling the truth will inevitably result in one's
neighbor's death at the hands of a murderer
'The French philosopher' [Kant's opponent] confounds the action
by which one does harm to another by telling the truth, the
admission of which he cannot avoid, with the action by which he
146. P. Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, Moral
Problems in Medicine, 267-68 (1976).
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does him wrong. It was merely an accident that the truth of the
statement did harm to the inhabitant of the house; it was not a free
deed. . . .Every man has .. . the strictest duty to truthfulness
in statements which he cannot avoid, whether they do harm to
himself or others. He, himself, properly speaking, does not do harm
to him who suffers thereby, but this harm is caused by ac-
cident." '
For Kant, as for Foot, one is not to blame for the death of his neighbor
under the circumstances. The death is the foreseen but not aimed-at
consequence of an action done with a proper motive: telling the truth.
Our moral intuitions-against which any ethical theory must
ulitmately be tested' 4 8- shout out that something is wrong with a theory
which produces such conclusions. In the situations described by Foot and
Kant, an otherwise morally worthy action has horrendous unavoidable
consequences. Since these consequences are both inevitable and fore-
seen, to choose the action for the sake of its worthy objective is also to
choose the morally undesirable consequences. One does not escape
responsibility for having brought about those consequences by claiming
that, while they were foreseen, they were not aimed at. 49 This standard
would make the moral permissibility of an action depend on a mental
sleight of hand. One must ascertain which of the consequences of the
action the actor was focusing on in her mind as the "aimed-at" goal when
she chose or did the action. The actor's "aim," however, is a Cartesian
"inner mental event" of which we can have no evidence, since its
existence is not determined by what the actor did or by the context in
which she did it. Thus, while it may be true that intentionally inflicted
harm is morally more culpable, and therefore more appropriate for state
or court interference, than is unintentionally inflicted harm, it is
147. Kant, Critique of Practical Essays and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, in
Moral Rules and Particular Circumstances 34 (1970).
148. Plato, Apology, Euthyphro. Crito (1948); Republic, Book 1 (1945).
149. What might excuse the action is the claim that there was no alternative under the
circumstances: that the duty to avoid the undesirable consequences was outweighed by a
greater moral obligation which could not have been fulfilled in any other way. This was not
the situation in Feeney, however, where there were alternative ways of assisting veterans
which would not have had the same consequences for women's employment opportunities
as the challenged statute. For the same reason, the commentators' argument, see supra note
75, that there are good reasons not to apply the tort law principle that an individual is
deemed to intend the natural and foreseeable consequences of her action to state legislative
action concerning complex social and economic problems, because the state needs to be free
to experiment with solutions to such problems, does not apply to the Feeney situation.
Feeney was not the kind of circumstance in which the state needs room to experiment freely
with new solutions to social problems whose consequences may not be foreseeable, for the
consequences of the preference were both inevitable and in fact foreseen. Furthermore,
there are widely used alternative programs which would have contributed to the same goals
without the undesirable consequences.
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implausible to make the criterion for intentional harm consist solely in the
actor's mental state while performing the action, in abstraction from the
nature of the action and the context in which it occurs.
3. An Atomistic Concept of Action
The Supreme Court's decision in Feeney turns on its characteriza-
tion of the challenged state action. In buttressing its characterization of
what the state did, the Court severely circumscribes the degree to which
social and historical factors determine that characterization. However,
human actions consist of more than mere physical movements made with
one's body. If I raise my arm up and down while standing on the deck of a
ship, what I am doing in moving my arm in this way-"signalling"- must
be included in the description of my action. 15 0 This description will be
expressed in terms of my immediate purposes, goals or intentions: I am
signalling an "S.O.S." to a helicopter flying overhead in order to get he!p.
My purposes or goals themselves presuppose the existence of a larger social
context which gives meaning to my action: in order for my arm waving to
constitute "signalling an S.O.S.," it is necessary both that the conventions
of the semaphore code have been established and that the possibility exist
that someone else whom I have reason to believe is familiar with those
conventions will see me. Otherwise my arm waving will not be "sig-
nalling." Thus, to describe my action in terms of its purpose or intent
necessarily implies a larger social context."1
The social context which must be included in the characterization of
the action will necessarily include the immediate, inevitable and fore-
seeable consequences of the bodily movements which make up an action
in that context. Choice of action in a given situation depends upon the
alternatives available. Even though none of the choices presented in a
given situation may be ideal, our choice involves not only the aimed-at
goal, but also its attendant inevitable and foreseeable results. Thus, it is
not clear why, in Professor Foot's example, performing the craniotomy is
described as killing the fetus while performing the hysterectomy is not.
Both operations, undertaken to save the mother, inevitably and fore-
seeably result in the fetus' death. At some point, of course, the effects of
the action become too remote and uncertain to be properly included in the
description of what one is doing-, but that is also true of one's desired
goals. " 2 It is the issue of proximity, not just whether the inevitable
150. A. Melden, Free Action, Ch. III-V (1961).
151. The Massachusetts legislature's goal of"rewarding veterans," for example, implies
the existence of a system of military service in which some individuals have served in the
past, a social or political need to continue this system because of the possibility of future wars
or other military confrontations, and some presumed facts about what motivates in-
dividuals to do such things as enlisting in the military.
152. See G. Anscombe, Intention, #23 (1950).
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forseen effect is desired which determines whether that effect should be
included in our characterization of the action.
To maintain that the actor intends the end without intending its
necessary means is still less plausible than to omit the immediate
consequences from the description of what she does.
In narrowing the range of factors it would look at to establish proof
of motive, intent or purpose, the Feeney Court adopted an atomistic
conception of an action. It considered actions as self-sufficient events,
isolated or abstracted from the context in which they occur. This
comports with the Court's view of motive or purpose as an isolated
"inner" mental event essentially unconnected to the social content giving
rise to the action.15 3
The Feeney Court thus adopted a philosophically outdated and
inadequate view of both the nature of human action and the nature of
mental phenomena. The Court characterized the challenged state action
in isolation or abstraction from most of the context in which that action
occurs: the relevant history, its immediate consequences, the alternatives
available to the state, and, apparently, even the means chosen to achieve
the end. Philosophically, however, the proper characterization of an
action requires reference to precisely these kinds of factors, which the
Court deemed irrelevant.
4. What Are "Purpose," "Intent," and "Motive"?
The writers of the various Supreme Court and district court
opinions in Feeney drew a number of different distinctions between
"motive," "purpose," and "intent." According to Judge Tauro, the
motive of the veterans' preference statute is to reward military service,
while its intent is to benefit veterans at the expense of women. " 4
According to Judge Campbell, the statute's goal is to benefit veterans,
whereas its inevitable impact and the availability of less burdensome
alternatives demonstrate discriminatory intent.is For Judge Murray,
intent and motive are the same. Motive is what prompted the legislature to
pass the law. The legislature's awareness of the statute's inevitable
consequences does not demonstrate intent.'5 6 Justice Stewart distin-
guished discriminatory purpose from intent as volition or awareness of
consequences. His concept of purpose is like Judge Murray's: purpose is
that which prompts passage of the law, the desired or aimed-at result.1'5
153. Justice Rehnquist's view of the legislative purpose of the statute in Trimble-to get
the language onto the statute books-is only a mild parody of this conception of intention
and action. 430 U.S. at 782.
154. See text acompanying notes 53-62.
155. See text acompanying notes 63-67.
156. See text acompanying notes 68-82.
157. See text acompanying notes 89-100.
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Justice Marshall used "purpose," "intention" and "goal" interchange-
ably, but his concept of those terms corresponds to Judge Tauro's and
Judge Campbell's concept of intent: severe foreseeable impact on a class
long subject to discrimination where less drastic alternative means are
available.1" 8
In its brief before the Supreme Court, the federal government
argued that, in past decisions, the Court has used "intent, .... purpose,"
and "motive" interchangeably to mean factors that motivated or con-
tributed to the challenged decision-" factors that motivated the persons
who took the challenged action." Thus, the government argued, the
district court's finding that the state did not act with the purpose of
limiting women's employment opportunities meant that the dispro-
portionate impact on women was not "intended" by the legislature.' 59 An
effect is intended only if it is a "desired consequence": only if the actor
would mention the effect in answer to the question "Why did you do
that?" Desired consequences include those measures chosen as means to
an end, as well as those chosen as ultimate ends. On the other hand,
foreseeable consequences, which are such that the actor would choose to
do the same action even if those consequences did not occur, are not
intended. They are mere side effects.
In his Trimble dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the entire
enterprise of scrutinizing the relationship between legislative purpose
and the means chosen to effect that purpose.' 60 Justice Rehnquist
criticizes the majority's reference to consideration of the law's "moti-
vating purpose." "Purpose," according to Rehnquist, refers to the
legislature's objective "to make the language contained in . . . [the
statute] a part of the . . . law."'' "Motive," on the other hand, means
"what the legislature had in mind or was trying to accomplish" by
enacting the law: why the legislature passed the law.'62 Motive is
especially hard to ascertain; it involves trying to intuit the thoughts of
individual legislators. 63
158. See text acompanying notes 103-122.
159. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27, Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979).
160. 430 U.S. at 781-84.
161. Id. at 782. This, of course, is positivistic nonsense, for it assumes that words exist in
abstraction from their meanings and uses. The issue is why the legislature chose to put that
language, with that particular meaning and intended result, into the Illinois Probate
Code.
162. Id. at 783.
163. Id. at 782-83. If overt legislative motive is so hard to ascertain, Justice Rehnquist
ought to have rejected the Davis rule altogether, since hidden discriminatory motive will be
that much harder to determine. That he instead espoused the test is indicative of the
prospects of the test ever being used by the court to find discrimination.
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Legal commentators also disagree over whether these three terms
should be distinguished. Mac Callum 64 would distinguish between intent
and purpose: purpose is the general aim of the statute, while intent
concerns either the details of the statute or the intended meaning of its
language. Ely rejects a similar distinction between "motive" and "pur-
pose."' 65 Eisenberg thinks that no meaningful distinction can be drawn
between "motive" and "purpose," either in terms of the immediacy of the
purpose or in terms or whether the goal is "overt" or "hidden."'' 66
How are we to determine what the differences are, if any, between
purposes, motives, intentions, goals and related phenomena? As an
alternative to inventing one's own definition, and as a propaedeutic to
theory construction based on these terms, the late J.L Austin proposed
that philosophers and social theorists examine how these expressions are
used in ordinary language.' 67 If we find that they are not always used
interchangeably, but that, for example, "motive" is sometimes used
where "intent" or "purpose" are not, we will have discovered something
useful about the "data" or "phenomena" to which these words relate.
Such data should be borne in mind in the construction of philosophical
and social theories. Austin advocated examining the grammatical
constructions of the terms under investigation as well as the terms
themselves. Like Wittgenstein,'6 Austin advocated looking at the
contexts in which the words are used and at how they are used in those
contexts, i.e., examining the linguistic activity the speaker is performing
in uttering the words in that particular context. Austin's method yields
results relevant to the issues raised in Feeney. 6 9
a. The Foreseeable Is Not "Unintentional"
If asked whether we intended to do some untoward act which we
did-for example, stepping on a baby's hand-we cannot reply, "No, I
didn't intend to," if we foresaw that our act would carry with it the
untoward result. We can reply that our action was unintentional only if in
some way we did not know what we were doing- "No, I didn't intend to
164. G. Mac Callum, Legislative Intent, 75 Yale LJ. 754, 758, 779 (1966).
165. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law. 79 Yale
LJ. 1205, 1217-21 (1970).
166. Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitu-
tionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L Rev. 36, 40, 106 n. 321 (1977).
167. See, e.g., J. Austin, A Plea for Excuses. Philosophical Papers (1962). Austin's
method is referred to as "ordinary language philosophy."
168. Wittgenstein speaks of "language games" which go to make up a "form of life."
Wittgenstein, supra note 134, ##23-25, 43, 48-54. The job of the philosopher is to
describe how words are used in the language games we play. Id. at ## 124, 126; "What we
do is bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use." Id. at #122.




step on the baby-I didn't see its hand there." If I fully realized what the
consequences of my action would be, then I cannot say that I didn't intend
those consequences or that I brought them about unintentionally. This is
so even if what I was aiming at in putting my foot down on the floor was not
to squash the baby's hand, but something else-to prevent myself from
falling, for example."0 This point, specifically recognized by Judge
Campbell,"' supports the view that, in its ordinary sense, we are
presumed to "intend" the inevitable and foreseeable consequences of our
actions.
b. "Motive"
One speaks of one's purposes, intentions, reasons and goals in a
wide range of situations where it would be inappropriate to speak of one's
"motives." For example, one might normally speak of one's"reason," but
not of one's"motive," for coming to work early this morning. A"motive"
is a special kind of reason or purpose to which we refer only when
discussing actions which are in some way untoward or "fishy." A
paradigm of the kind of action to which we assign a motive is a murder or
assault. We presume that these actions are abnormal; thus they require
special explanation before we can understand them.
Motive can also mean a covert or improper reason underlying an
action which might have a legitimate surface reason. Thus we speak of the
legislature's or city's discriminatory motive in cases like Gomillion'" and
Palmer."3 Again, a motive inquiry is appropriate because there is
something untoward about the action. The twenty-eight sided figure in
Gomillion and the city's sudden closing of its swimming pools in Palmer
were "fishy"; they do not represent the types of action we would normally
expect a governmental entity to take.
Thus, in ordinary usage, "motive" is not interchangeable with
"purpose" or "intent." But, if we are looking for discriminatory intent or
purpose, then it is appropriate to speak of motive, since discrimination is
not something which is openly approved or accepted. The paradigm case
is one in which an ostensibly legitimate reason or purpose given for an
action is merely a pretext cloaking a different, discriminatory purpose or
motive. 174
170. This does not mean that I will necessarily describe my bringing about of the
consequences as intentional, orthat I will say "Yes I did intend to step on the baby.'- I may
say neither. See Austin, supra note 167, at 137-38.
171. See text accompanying notes 63-67.
172. 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (invalidating a state act which changed the boundaries of
Tuskegee, Alabama from a square shape to a twenty-eight sided figure, eliminating nearly all
black voters from the city).
173. 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (upholding a city council's action to close all city pools
following a court order to desegregate the pools).
174. As many commentators have pointed out, a legislature's motive in enacting a
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c. "MAotivation"
The term "motivation," along with its derivatives "motivating" and
"motivate," is not ordinarily used except as a spillover term from
psychology. When so used, it occurs in the same type of situation as
"motive": when something untoward has happened which needs explain-
ing. Its connotation in this situation is different from that of "motive,"
however. "Motivation" refers more to irrational than to rational factors
which cause actions. For example, we might say that G's "motive" in
arranging for the execution of his arch-rival, D, is to gain complete control
of the sanitation services in Chicago, but that depression "motivated"
Professor X to kill himself, or that sensual gratification in setting fires
"motivated" Y to set fire to the Las Vegas Hilton. "Depression" and
"sensual gratification in setting fires" are not reasons for choosing to
perform actions; rather, they are irrational forces which overcome us,
causing us to do things we would not rationally choose to do.
d. Different Uses of "Intention"
"Intention" has a number of different constructions and uses, some
of which overlap with "purposes" or "goals," and others which do not.
These uses of "intention" and "intend" seem to fall into two main
categories, centering around the questions of whether the actor knew what
he was doing and at what the actor was aiming. Contrary to Judge
Murray's position in Feeney, however, it is not necessary in any of these
uses that what is intended be desired. One can know that a certain event
will occur as a result of one's actions, or even aim at bringing about that
action, without desiring that it occur. Thus, contrary to Feeney, the
absence of desire that the challenged result occur does not mean that that
result was intended.
e. "Purpose"
We can speak of either the"purpose" in doing a particular action or
the overall purpose of a particular program or project. In the first use,
one's purpose in performing a particular action or making a particular
choice is like one's intention; it is the reason for the action. In the second
usage, it is thegoal of the program, activity, or statute. All statutes or state
action must have a purpose in this second sense, and it is this "purpose"
which the Court examines under the equal protection clause. Individual
portions of the statute will also have purposes in relation to the overall
purpose of the statute; these minor purposes may be less easy to ascertain
measure is not the same as the motives of individual legislators in voting for it. If we are
concerned with whether the statute has a discriminatory motive it is the former rather than




than the statute's overall purpose.'
Unlike at least some motives, purposes do not cause our actions; a
purpose is an explicitly aimed-at, rational goal which one consciously
adopts. When we speak of actions being caused by motives such as
jealousy, anger, or prejudice (or "motivated" by such factors), on the
other hand, the model is that of an individual being impelled to act in a
certain way by a psychological force which he has not adopted as a
consciously aimed-at ideal or goal.1
76
f Conclusion
While the meaning of "motive," "intention" and "purpose"
overlap, these concepts should not be conflated. Not every purpose or
intent is a motive: we look for a motive only where there is a reason to
suspect a hidden, forbidden purpose or explanation. Intent is broader
than "purpose." Intent relates both to whether one knew what she was
doing as well as at what she was aiming.
Both connotations of "intent" are relevant to the issue of an entity's
responsibility for its actions. Judges Tauro and Campbell correctly
distinguished between the questions of the legislature's purpose in
enacting the veterans' preference and whether the statute's discrimina-
tory consequences were intentional. Rather than conflating discrimina-
tory purpose with discriminatory intent, the Court must decide which of
these concepts is determinative. If the Court determines that discrimina-
tory "motive" is required, then the Davis rule, for example, becomes
simply a pretext inquiry and foreseeable discriminatory impact is
relevant only in extreme cases."7 However, a more philosophically
adequate conception of discriminatory intent would extend beyond cases
in which discrimination is an explicitly "aimed-at" result. The Court
needs to reexamine and to clarify the meaning it wishes to assign to
"intent" in the light of the rationale behind its holding in Davis.
The next section considers whether the Court's present purposeful
discrimination requirement is contrary to the rationale originally offered
by commentators and jurists in support of an intent standard. It finds that
the Court, in its most recent discrimination decisions, equivocates on the
rationale, importance and application of its intent standard.
I1. The Legal Significance of Feeney
Feeney represents a radical reversal of both the purpose and the
scope of the "motive" test. The test's original purpose was inclusionary; it
175. Mac Callum. supra note 164. at 779.
176. This distinction is recognized by Professor Ely. even though he professes to see no
distinction between motives and purposes. Ely. supra note 165. at 1221 & n. 60.
177. E.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot. 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (statute had no genuine purpose
except to exclude blacks).
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was sought to extend equal protection coverage to cases of discrimination
not reachable by a "disparate impact" test. The rule's broad parameters,
set forth in Arlington Heights, are consistent with this purpose. Feeney
severely limits the reach of the Arlington Heights rule, converting the
motive test into a method of excluding or rejecting discrimination
claims.
A. Recent History of the Motive Test
The motive test originated in Justice White's dissent in Palmer,"',
where the majority upheld Jackson, Mississippi's decision to close its
public swimming pools in order to avoid racially integrating them
pursuant to court order." 9 The Supreme Court majority held that the
city's decision did not violate the equal protection clause because its
impact fell equally on blacks and whites. 180 The Court, citing its rejection
of the motive test in O'Brien,"S' rejected plaintiffs' argument that the city's
decision denied equal protection to blacks because it was motivated by a
desire to avoid integration.'82 O'Brien set forth two problems the Court
found with a motive test: the difficulties inherent in ascertaining
legislative motive, and the futility of judicial invalidation of state action on
motive grounds when the legislature could simply reenact the same law
for a "purer" motive.'18 In Palmer, the majority also pointed to the
difficulty of ascertaining which is the "sole" or "dominant" motive
underlying state action, since different legislators presumably have
different motives. 8 4
In dissent, Justice White rejected the majority's view "that it is
impermissible to impeach the otherwise valid act of closing municipal
swimming pools by resort to evidence of invidious purpose or motive."' 85
In support of his position, Justice White cited desegregation decisions and
a 1970 article by Professor Ely' 6 for the proposition that the reasons
178. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 240.
179. Id. at 219.
180. Id. at 225.
181. "It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." O'Brien,
391 U.S. at 383.
182. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224.
183. Id. at 224-25, O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383-84. Professor Ely pointed out that a third
reason is implied, in both Palmer and in O'Brien: the disutility of invalidating a good law simply
because of the process which produced it. This concern regarding the motive test was first
raised in Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L Rev. 341,
356-61 (1949). Ely. supra note 165, at 1215.
184. Palmer. 403 U.S. at 225.
185. Id. at 241.
186. Ely, supra note 165. Professor Ely advocated the use of a motive test to trigger
"rationally defensible difference** review in cases of random or discretionary state choice
where review would not otherwise be available.
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underlying certain official acts are highly relevant in assessing the
constitutional validity of those acts. 87 Professor Ely rebutted O'Brien's
general rejection of motive, arguing that the validity of the ascertainabili-
ty, futility and disutility objections in some contexts does not imply that
these difficulties are always determinative. 8 Justice White would infer
discriminatory motive by reference to a broad range of external,
"objective" factors involving the historical and present context of the
challenged actions. '8 9 These factors included the state and city's official
hard line against integration, the public statements of city officials in
connection with the desegregation litigation, and the timing of the
decision to close the pools- immediately after black citizens demanded
desegregation of public facilities in accordance with the district court's
declaratory judgment.'19 In addition, the city's supposedly neutral
reasons for its decision- concerns about economics and preserving peace
and order-were inconsistent with its previous policies and with the
actual state of affairs in the present context.2 9' Justice White's approach
comports with the test advocated by Professor Ely, that "[d]ispropor-
tionate racial impact is usually the best evidence that race has been
employed as the criterion of selection."' 92
In 1973, Justice White authored the Court's opinion in White, 93 in
which the Court held multi-member voting districts in Dallas and Bexar
Counties, Texas violative of the equal protection rights of black and
Mexican-American voters. Adopting the findings of the district court
"representing . . . a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of
the design and impact of the Bexar County multi- member districts in the
light of past and present reality, political and otherwise," the Court held
that the multi-member districts were used invidiously to cancel out or
minimize the voting strength of racial groups.1 94 While the Court's
opinion did not distinguish between discriminatory intent and dis-
criminatory impact, Justices White and Stewart later referred to White as
187. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 264.
188. Ely, supra note 165, at 1277-81.
189. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 247-55.
190. Id.
191. The city had traditionally operated the pools at a loss because of an expressed policy
of keeping the fees "'low in order to serve as many people as possible'" and there was little
evidence to support the city's contention that the pools could not be operated safely on an
integrated basis, since there had been no disorder or violence when the city desegregated its
other recreational facilities. Id. at 251-52, 259-61.
192. Ely, supra note 165, at 1254.
193. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
194. Id. at 769-70. The factors considered by the district court with regard to Bexar
County included a long history of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in such areas
as "education, employment, economics, health and politics," the low income, high
unemployment rate and poor housing in the barrio in which most Mexican-Americans in the
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turning on motive.' Here again Justice White would infer discrimina-
tory intent from "objective" factors making up the context of the
challenged action, including its history and other present indicia of
discrimination.
In Keyes v. School District No. 1,'96 the Court officially reinstated
discriminatory "purpose" as a necessary condition of an equal protection
violation in school systems with no history of official state-imposed
segregation. Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority, however,
articulated broad rules regarding the finding of de jure segregation. ,97
county lived, the existence of cultural and language barriers which made participation in
community and political processes extremely difficult, and the past use of the poll tax and
extremely restrictive voter registration procedures denying Mexican-Americans access to
Texas political processes even longer than blacks. Id. at 768. This history resulted in a low
voter turnout rate and an extreme paucity of Mexican-Americans elected to the state
legislature. Id. at 768-69. In addition, the Bexar County legislative delegation had been
insufficiently responsive to the needs of the Mexican-American community. Assessing the
multi-member district "overlaid . . . on the cultural and economic realities of the
Mexican-American community in Bexar County and its relationship with the rest of the
county," the district court concluded that Mexican-Americans were effectively removed
from the county's political processes, Id. at 769. Similar factors were considered by the
district court with regard to the situation of blacks in Dallas County: a history of official
discrimination which adversely affected the right of blacks to register, other features of the
Texas electoral system which enhanced the opportunity for racial discrimination in a multi-
member district, the extreme underrepresentation of blacks in the state legislature, and
racism by the Democratic party committee in charge of slating candidates. Id. at 766-
67.
195. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 69, 94-95 (1980).
196. 413 U.S. 189 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Keyes].
197. (1) The segregation need not be statutory, but can consist of such actions and
policies of the school authorities as the structuring of attendance zones, the making of
decisions as to the location and size of new schools, the use of mobile classrooms, and the
adoption of transfer policies so as to concentrate minority students in one specific area.
Assignment of faculty and staff on a racially segregated basis so that certain schools are
identifiable as "black" or "Mexican-American" schools is further evidence of de jure
segregation. Id. at 201-05.
(2) Where a present condition of segregation exists which is traceable to intentional
segregation at the time of the court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), that condition can be treated aspresent intentional segregation warranting judicial
intervention. An independent finding of present segregative intent is not required. Thus
where school officials had previously performed such actions as gerrymandering the school
attendance boundaries in order to create all black schools, the mere assertion of adherence to
a neighborhood school policy is not sufficient to rebut an inference of de jure segregation;
such intentionally segregative actions affect the composition of the neighborhoods
themselves. Id. at 205-13.
(3) Proof of de jure segregation in a substantial portion of the school system creates a
rebuttable presumption that the entire school system is a dual system: that the existence of
de facto segregation in other portions of the system "is not adventitious." Id. at 203, 208.
Here again, intent is to be inferred from a broad range of factors in the historical and present
context of the challenged institution. Id. at 211.
Law and Inequality
In Davis,' 5 the Court overturned its logic in O'Brien and Palmer
sub silentio, explicitly adopting a" motive" test as a necessary condition
for all equal protection violations. 99 Justice White, writing for the
majority, distinguished between the test for a violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act as articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., ,00 and the test
for a finding of invidious discrimination under the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. 0 1 Whereas under the Civil Rights Act a finding of
discriminatory impact is sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the
employer to show that the challenged job selection procedure is sub-
stantially related to job performance, Davis held that proof of discrimina-
tory impact alone is not even sufficient to require heightened scrutiny,
much less to establish an equal protection violation. Proof of discrimina-
tory purpose is required. 20 2
Justice White's opinion attempted to explain away "indications to
the contrary" in previous decisions, arguing that since Palmer turned on
the absence of discriminatory motive for the pool closings, its warnings
against relying on motivation were mere dicta ' 3 Justice White raised two
policy arguments in support of adopting motive over impact. The first
argument is that an impact approach would "raise serious questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public
service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome
to the poor and to the average black man than to the more affluent
white." 0 Secondly, Justice White argued that an "impact" approach
grants rights to individuals as members of groups which they do not have
as individuals, since no individual who failed a racially neutral em-
ployment test could claim a denial of his equal protection rights, whatever
his race. 0s As noted above, however, discriminatory impact can be an
198. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
199. Id. at 242.
200. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs rule had been relied on by the First Circuit in
Castro, 459 F.2d at 731 (1972).
201. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-39.
202. Id. at 239. The majority opinion specifically disapproved a number of circuit court
cases holding that substantially disproportionate racial impact is sufficient to prove racial
discrimination violative of the equal protection clause, "absent some justification going
substantially beyond what would be necessary to validate most other legislative classifi-
cations." Id. at 244-45 n. 12. Among the cases so disapproved was Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S.
1030 (1975).
203. Justice White's argument rested on the fact that the Palmer Court accepted the
city's explanation in terms of economic and police power considerations. Id. at 242-43.
204. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. This argument is taken seriously by the commentators:
Brest, Forewor& In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 25
(1976); Eisenberg, supra note 166, at 46, 54-55.
205. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245-46.
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important element in the proof of discriminatory intent. 210
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens expressed reservations
about the "motivation" requirement, noting that there is no "bright line"
between impact and intent: impact-what happened-often provides the
best evidence of intent.20 7 Stevens' concerns echo O'Brien and Palmer:
"It is unrealistic, on the one hand, to require the victim of alleged
discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of the decision-
maker or, conversely, to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply
because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in
the decisional process." 0 8 On the other hand, in cases of egregious
disproportionate impact, such as Gomillion or Yick Wo, it does not
matter whether the standard is phrased in terms of motive or effect.2 09
Arlington Heights provided the Court an opportunity to further
articulate and elaborate its standards for applying the Davis rule and to
reconsider Davis' less than satisfactory justification for that rule. Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, justified Davis' motive test by the
argument that the judicial deference normally accorded legislative and
administrative decisions is no longer warranted once it is established that
a discriminatory purpose is a motivating factor in that decision.1
In applying the Davis rule to Arlington Heights' refusal to rezone a
parcel of land for a low and moderate income housing project which would
be racially integrated, Justice Powell set forth broad rules for the inference
from discriminatory impact to discriminatory intent. He first made clear
that it is not necessary to establish that discriminatory purpose was the
sole or dominant concern animating the challenged state action so long as
it was "a motivating factor." '' Justice Powell then set forth six forms of
inference to discriminatory intent from the context of the challenged
action, elaborating the "totality of circumstances" approach mentioned in
Davis. In all of these "forms of inference," the impact of the official action
206. See text accompanying note 6.
207. Davis, 426 U.S. at 253-55.
208. Id. at 253.
209. Id. at 254. Justices Brennan and Marshall did not dissent from the Court's adoption
of the "motive" rule nor from its finding of no discriminatory motive on the facts of the case,
except to criticize the propriety of the court's disapproval of the cases cited in its note 12, id.
at 244 n. 12, especially the disapproval of theArlington Heights case, in which certiorari
had already been granted, id. at 257 n. 1.
210. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66. In this connection, Justice Powell cited a
1971 article by Professor Brest suggesting reasons for examining motive. Brest, supra note
75. According to Professor Brest, the Court should inquire into the decisionmaker's
motivation if a rule is neutral on its face but there is reason to believe that the decisionmaker
may have given weight to an impermissible factor in promulgating it. This is because the
government is constitutionally prohibited from pursuing certain objectives, and considera-
tion of an illicit objective may determine the outcome of a legislative decision by giving
improper weight to the impermissible factor. Id. at 114, 118-20.
211. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66.
19831
Law and Inequality [Vol. 1:277
"may provide an important starting point" for inferences of intent: 2
(1) The effects of the governmental action may exhibit "a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race," as in Yick Wo 113 or
Gomillion."4 In these cases, impact alone is determinative.
(2) The historical background may reveal a series of official actions
taken for invidious purposes. '
Further evidence of motive may be provided by:
(3) the specific sequence of events leading to the action;23 6
(4) departures from normal procedural sequences for making that
type of decision; '
(5) substantial departures from the factors usually considered
important for that type of decision, so that the decision appears arbitrary
and unreasonable;'" and
(6) an examination of the legislative or administrative history,
which may produce statements by the decisionmakers as to their true
purpose.
2 1 9
While these six types of inquiry are proper subjects for an
investigation into intent, the list is not intended to be exhaustive.2 0 If
212. Id. at 265-66.
213. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 256 (1886).
214. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 365 U.S. 339 (1960).
215. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. See Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218
(1964); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
216. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at267. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 357 U.S. 369 (1967);
Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961); and Kennedy Park Homes
Assoc. v. Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1970), in which the property sought for an
integrated housing project had always been zoned for multi-family units until the town
learned of the project, whereupon the land was rezoned for park land.
217. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 268.
220. Id. The six factors are similar to those set forth by Professor Brest in his 1971
article. Brest, supra note 75, at 120-24. Brest listed the following factors as indicative of
discriminatory intent: the preceding and concurrent events and situations; the content of the
"operative rule" itself(the prescription made by the law or decision as to how people shall be
treated); whether the decisionmaker considered the costs of the decision and the availability
of less costly alternatives; whether the regulation is poorly or dubiously suited to its stated
objective;, the timing of the decision; any past history of overt discrimination along the lines
of the suspected illicit motivation; whether other decisions of the same decisionmaker seem
designed to reach the same illicit result; and whether the decision is a radical departure from
the decisionmaker's past practice. Brest's tests of failure to consider costs and less costly
alternatives and of whether the decision is ill-suited to its stated objectives are presumably
what Justice Powell meant by substantial departures from the usually determinative factors
for that type of decision. Brest's test of whether other decisions of the decisionmaker reach
the same result is an addition to the Arlington Heights tests, however. According to Brest,
even when there is reliable direct evidence of legislative intent in the form of statements of
individual legislators, there is the difficulty of attributing the motives of those individual
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discriminatory purpose is proven, the burden then shifts to defendant to
establish that the same decision would have resulted even without the
impermissible purpose. 2 '
Arlington Heights set the stage for determining the Feeney issue of
whether foreseeable discriminatory impact is sufficient to prove dis-
criminatory intent. As explicated by the Court inArlington Heights, the
Davis rule is Wittgensteinian: '2 motive is to be inferred from an
examination of a wide range of factors making up the context of the
challenged action, including its impact, its history, and the agency's usual
practices and criteria. The Court's statement that the six patterns of
inference are not intended to be exhaustive is also Wittgensteinian, for
Wittgenstein stressed that the concepts we use in our "language games"
are open-ended. Significantly, the Court's "liberal" members-those
justices who have been most concerned with the vindication of the rights
of oppressed minorities-had up to this point raised no objection to the
majority's intent standard. 2 '3
legislators to the legislative body itself. Such "direct evidence" will therefore always have to
be used in conjunction with the above "circumstantial" factors. Id. at 124.
221. ML Healthy School Dist v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Applying these criteria to
the village's denial of plaintiffs' rezoning application, the Court found no discriminatory
motivation. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270. Approval of the rezoning would have been
inconsistent with the village's "buffer zone policy," since multi-family units were to serve as
a buffer between single-family developments and commercial or manufacturing uses. Id. at
270. The Court found that the "buffer zone policy" had not been administered in a
discriminatorily selective manner, and that there was nothing suspicious, either pro-
cedurally or substantively, about the sequence of events leading to the decision. Id. at 269.
Although there had been heated discussion of the proposal at three public meetings focusing
on the "social issue"-the desirability of introducing housing that would probably be
racially integrated-the Court found that the statements by the plan commission and by the
village board members at the meetings focused almost exclusively on the zoning issues and
that the village had been consistent in its concerns for the maintenance of single-family
zoning. Id. at 269-70.
Justices Marshall and Brennan, concurring and dissenting, did not object to the
Court's adopted rules for inferring discriminatory intent. They dissented only in regard to
the Court's holding, on the grounds that the case should have been remanded to the district
court for a reassessment of the evidence in light of the Davis rule. Id. at 271-72. Justice
White, dissenting, agreed that remand would have been appropriate rather than the Court's
re-examining the evidence itself. Id. at 272. He also objected to the Court's "lengthy
discussion of the standard for proving the racially discriminatory purpose required by
Davis," and to its listing "various 'evidentiary sources' or 'subjects of proper inquiry' in
determining whether a racially discriminatory purpose existed," as unnecessary. He would
have simply accepted the district court's finding, held not clearly erroneous by the court of
appeals, that the village's decision was motivated by a legitimate desire to protect property
values and the integrity of its zoning plan. Id. at 273.
222. See text accompanying notes 137-43.
223. It is not clear, however, whether the Arlington Heights Court followed its own
standard, it did not discuss the issue, apparently of concern to the Seventh Circuit, of why no
blacks lived in Arlington Heights. The court of appeals had held that it was necessary to
Law and Inequality
Shortly afterA rlington Heights was decided, the Court applied the
Davis-Arlington Heights rule in Castaneda v. Partida224 to a claim of
discrimination in grand jury selection procedures in Hidalgo County,
Texas. The Court majority found that a forty percent underrepresentation
of Mexican-Americans on the grand jury panel, despite the fact that a
"governing majority" of Mexican-Americans lived in the county, con-
stituted an example of a"clear pattern [of discrimination], unexplainable
on grounds other than race."' 25 Adopting the Davis "totality of cir-
cumstances" rule, the Court held that disproportionate impact, plus the
use of non-neutral selection procedures, shifted the burden of proof to
defendant, which had failed to rebut plaintiffs prima facie case.22
Justices Powell and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented,
however, on the grounds that the majority relied on disproportionate
impact as proof of intent. 2 ' Very rarely, the dissenters argued, will proof
of disproportionate impact be sufficient to prove intent: Yick Wo and
Gomillion are exceptions. Instead, one must look forother circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent, examining carefully the factors explaining
the statistical disparity, to determine whether the selection procedures
used are racially neutral."'
In an opinion which clearly articulated the issue ultimately decided
in Feeney, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Texas Education Agency
(Austin 111)229 adopted Justice Stevens' "intend the natural and fore-
seeable consequences" standard of intent when faced with a Supreme
examine the rezoning denial "in light of its 'historical context and ultimate effect.' "
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,413 (7th Cir. 1975).
This included the fact that while Northwest Cook County was expanding rapidly in
employment opportunities and housing, a high degree of residential segregation remained.
The village had been "exploiting the problem by allowing itself to become an almost one
hundred percent white community," and it had no other plans for building low-cost
housing. There were no parcels of land in the village already zoned for multiple family units
which could have been used by the developer as alternative sites. Id. at 414.
224. 430 U.S. 482 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Partida].
225. id. at 493.
226. Id. at 494-95.
227. Id. at 510-11.
228. Id. at 512. The evidence of non-neutral selection procedures relied on by the
majority inPartida was insufficient, the dissent argued, since the judge who appointed the
jury commissioners, three out of five commissioners, ten out of twenty members of the grand
jury array, and five out of twelve grand jurors were Mexican-Americans. Id. at 514. Since
Mexican-Americans also controlled the political processes in Hidalgo County, constituting
a majority of elected officials and judges in the county, Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist felt it was unlikely that they would discriminate against "those who
share their own identifiable attributes." Id. at 514-16. The case was therefore different from
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), where the jury commission and the judge who
appointed it were all white. Partida, 430 U.S. at 512.
229. 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977).
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Court remand order for reconsideration of its earlier decision in light of
Davis.230 In United States v. Texas Education Agency (Austin II), 23' the
Fifth Circuit had already reviewed, in light of Keyes,232 its earlier
finding 3 of an equal protection violation in a tri-race school system,
affirming its original holding on the basis of itsAustin I finding that the
segregative effects of the school district's assignment policies were
foreseeable.2" 4 In adopting this rule, Judge Wisdom, in Austin 11, had
pointed to the difficulty of obtaining "direct evidence" of school officials'
intentions and the consequent need to use circumstantial evidence. '3
However, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Austin 11 for
reconsideration in light of Davis.23
On remand inAustin III, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its findings of
intentional segregation of Mexican-American students in the light of
Davis andArlington Heights.2" 7 Judge Wisdom reaffirmed the "objective
intent" standard adopted in Austin 1.23s Noting that Keyes, Davis, and
Arlington Heights did not specify whether establishing an equal
protection violation required proof of an "objective" or a "subjective"
standard of discriminatory intent, Judge Wisdom's opinion reiterated the
difficulties inherent in the use of the subjective standard as pointed out in
Austin 1I and pointed to Justice Stevens' Davis concurrence as sup-
porting an objective standard. 239
230. Id. at 168.
231. 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976).
232. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
233. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as Austin I].
234. Austin , 532 F.2d at 388-89. TheAustin H court pointed to actions of the school
board which inevitably produced or maintained segregation of Mexican-American students
when alternative actions would have produced integration. Such actions included adoption
of a neighborhood school policy where residential segregation existed, choice of school sites,
construction and renovation of schools, drawing of attendance zones, student assignment
and transfer policies, and faculty and staff assignments. Id. at 390-92.
235. Id. at 388. In this connection, Judge Wisdom cited Professor Brest's guidelines for
inferring intent from circumstantial evidence. See discussion, supra note 220.
236. Austin Independent School District v. U.S., 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
237. Austin III, 564 F.2d at 174.
238. Id. at 166-70.
239. Id. at 167-68. Judge Wisdom's opinion retreats from theAustin H rule only so far
as to recognize that, where there is no other evidence of discriminatory intent, Davis and
Arlington Heights provide that a neighborhood school policy by itself, when motivated by
racially and ethnically neutral bona fide concerns such as the desire to have the children
attend the school closest to home, is not unconstitutional even though the natural and
foreseeable result of the policy is de facto segregation. Id. at 169-70. However, Judge
Wisdom would withhold the application of the "foreseeable consequences" standard only
from those official acts and decisions which have a firm basis in well accepted and
historically sound non-discriminatory social policy. He indicates that"as a practical matter,
in school desegregation cases we can envision few official actions, other than the decision to
1983]
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The Supreme Court denied certiorari to Austin 111.240
B. The Significance of Feeney
The foregoing discussion enables us to appreciate Feeney's signi-
ficance with respect to the interpretation of the "motive" test for an equal
protection violation. It is clear that in Feeney, the Court felt called upon to
decide the issue raised in Austin III of whether "objective" or "sub-
jective" intent is the appropriate standard for the Davis-Arlington
Heights rule. As noted above,141 the Court adopted the "subjective"
model, whereby the trier of fact is required to probe the minds of the
decisionmakers to ascertain what " desires," or "aims" led to the decision.
External events may be evidence or signs of events in the decisionmaker's
mind, but are not identified with the latter.
The Court's choice of this Cartesian "subjective" model greatly
aggravates the "ascertainability" and "futility" objections to the use of
"motivation" as a test of an equal protection violation. 42 According to the
Wittgensteinian "objective" model, motives and intentions are essential-
ly connected to events in the historical and present context of the action.
Consequently, they are ascertainable in the same way as any other events
or states of affairs. According to the subjective standard, however,
motives and intentions are unascertainable, in principle, by anyone
other than the agent.
2 11
We can observe this dichotomy by applying the "subjective" test
for ourselves to the Feeney situation. How are we to establish that the
clearly foreseen and inevitable adverse impact of the veterans' preference
on women was not a desired result of the state legislature's action, but
merely something "in spite of which" that action was undertaken? How
would the legislature itself know this? According to the subjective model
of intention as an inner event in the mind of the actor, it is impossible for
an external observer to ascertain another's intent, even if the actor knows
which consequences are focused on in choosing a course of action.
Further, it is not even clear, under this standard, that one can speak of the
use a neighborhood school policy for student assignment, that would not be subject to the
'natural foreseeable consequences' rule." Id. at 168. Decisions as to school locations, the
construction and renovation of schools, school closing, the drawing of student attendance
zones, and faculty and staff assignment, on the other hand, are particularly subject to the
rule because there "'the presumption is especially probative." Id. at 169. In addition,
discriminatory intent can be inferred from the school board's refusal to take action to
ameliorate segregation. Id. at 170.
240. 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
241. See text accompanying notes 89-95.
242. See text accompanying note 183, Brestsupra note 75, at 119-30; Ely, supra note
165, at 1212-23; Eisenberg, supra note 166, at 114-17.
243. See text accompanying notes 132-37.
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intent of the legislature as distinguished from the intentions of its
members, since the legislature has no separate mind which experiences
inner events such as desires, goals, aims, etc. Thus, since the motive test is
impossible to satisfy, it will be seldom that facially neutral state action is
invalidated on equal protection grounds.
244
The "futility" problem is also exacerabated under the subjective
conception of intent. To reenact the same law for a different motive, all the
legislator or administrator need do is focus on something else "in his
mind's eye" the second time around: to take "mental aim" at a different
aspect of the situation. Under the objective, Wittgensteinian conception,
on the other hand, it is not as easy to reenact the same law for a different
motive. The law must actually function differently in the external
world.
A third difficulty with the use of a "motive" test is also exacerbated
by a subjective conception of motive. As pointed out by Professors Brest
and Karst 4' and by Justice Powell, 4 6 to impugn the decisionmaker's
motives is a personal affront which is not to be indulged unless the accuser
is absolutely certain of the truth of her accusation. The chances of
obtaining certainty are less, and the affront greater, under the subjective
conception of "motive" than if "motive" is related to the action's impact.
Under the subjective conception we are impugning the actor's character,
or "soul"; under the objective conception we are merely talking about
what was done. Thus, for this reason also, official action seldom will be
invalidated.
It is enlightening to note, in this context, that, from the time Davis
was decided until the 1982 term, 4" no Supreme Court cases with the
exception of Partida and two school desegregation cases 248 decided
immediately after Feeney found discriminatory purpose. These cases,
however, involving jury selection and school desegregation where official
244. Thus Professor Ely has recently expressed concern that the effect of the Supreme
Court's use of the motive test, which he was the first to advocate, "has been in each case to
deny the constitutional claim." Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15
San Diego L Rev. 1155, 1161 (1978).
245. Brest, supra note 75, at 128-30 (Brest calls this the "impropriety" argument);
Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 San Diego L Rev. 1163, 1164-65
(1978).
246. Partida, 430 U.S. at 516 (Powell, J., dissenting).
247. In 1982, in Pullman-Standard, Inc. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982), the Court held
that the question of intentional discrimination is a pure question of fact, subject to reversal
only on the "clearly erroneous" standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. Id. at 290-93. This made the
determination of intent subject to the vagaries of lower court findings of fact, and has led to
inconsistent holdings. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) and Rogers v. Lodge, 102
S.Ct. 3272 (1982); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 102 S.Ct. 3187 (1982),
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 102 S. Ct. 3211 (1982).
248. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
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segregation existed at the time of Brown v. Board of Education, 24 9 are
special kinds of cases in which discriminatory intent is less difficult to
prove under the Davis standard than is normally true. In jury cases the
absence of discrimination should lead to a result reflecting the proportion
of the minority group members in the general population. Similarly,
school districts officially segregated at the time of Brown have an
affirmative duty to desegregate: failure to take action to undo the dual
school system constitutes a further equal protection violation without
need of further proof of intent.2 . Thus, in these two types of cases,
discriminatory impact is sufficient to prove intent.2 5'
The Court has thus come full circle from the time of Palmer,"2 '
when commentators and Supreme Court justices were impelled, in
response to Supreme Court statements that motivation was irrelevant, to
argue in favor of the consideration of motivation. Consideration of
motivation is necessary, the argument went, to encompass obvious equal
protection violations, such as the closing of the swimming pools in
Palmer, which could not be handled by an "impact only" test. Such
arguments proposed "motive" as an inclusionary test enabling courts to
find violations in cases which had intuitive merit, not as an exclusionary
test requiring courts to exclude cases having intuitive merit. The view
advocated in the early articles referred to by the Court as support for the
motive test was not that motivation is a necessary condition, but that it is
sometimes a sufficient condition for heightened scrutiny or invalida-
tion. 2
While supposedly merely clarifying the Davis-Arlington Heights
standard with respect to the role of impact in proving intent, Feeney in fact
changes that standard in a manner not consistent with the Court's earlier
articulations. Rather than simply elaborating the implications of the
Davis and Arlington Heights rules, Feeney retreats from those rules.
Hence, Justices Marshall and Brennan, neither of whom had objected to
the motivation requirement in Davis or Arlington Heights, dissented
vigorously in Feeney, stressing the necessity of objective criteria in
matters of intent.2"S
The extent of the change is seen when one considers that application
of the six Arlington Heights patterns of inference would have allowed
Feeney to establish an equal protection violation. She had clearly
249. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
250. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200.
251. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241; Partida, 430 U.S. at 493-94 (discriminatory impact
shifts burden to defendant to disprove discriminatory intent).
252. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
253. Ely, supra note 165, at 1207; Brest, supra note 75. See also Eisenberg, supra note
166, at 47-49, 149.
254. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 282-86.
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demonstrated a history of discrimination against women in the military
on the basis of "archaic and overbroad generalizations" regarding the
proper role of women,2"' citing specific regulations and policies which had
drastically restricted the opportunities of women for military service.256
The Court itself, as Justice Stewart admitted, has taken notice of women's
inferior opportunities in military service. Events leading to the chal-
lenged action also arouse suspicion regarding motivation. The statute
provided for a special exemption from the preference for jobs "calling for
women." Also, the legislature amended the statute to exclude attorney
positions after the Anthony suit was filed, thereby eliminating all the
plaintiffs save Feeney. In addition, the legislature failed to consider less
costly methods of achieving its aim, despite the fact that such alternatives
not only were available and known to it, but were practically the universal
norm (since the federal government and all other states but three utilized a
point preference rather than an absolute preference). According to Justice
Marshall, the fact that the statute is ill-suited to meet its stated
objectives25 also raised the issue of legislative departures from appro-
priate substantive considerations.
The Feeney Court, however, refused to consider four of the six
factors mentioned inArlington Heights. It refused to consider the history
of discrimination against women in the military on which the veterans'
preference is "overlaid," it declined to address the issue of past
exemptions for "women's jobs" as indicative of discriminatory purpose,
and it did not view the usual state practice of adopting a less restrictive
form of preference as indicating a departure from the appropriate
substantive considerations in relation to the legislature's specified goal.
The Court was content to consider only the question of whether the
challenged legislative action had some other explanations besides sex
discrimination (Arlington Heights' first test) and selected aspects of the
legislative history. Those criteria, however, cannot constitute the sole test
for discriminatory motive, since Arlington Heights specifically rejected
the requirement that discriminatory motive be the sole or dominant
purpose.25 The fact that some other explanation besides discriminatory
motive exists does not demonstrate that discriminatory motive is not also
operative.
TheFeeney Court's retreat fromArlington Heights' codification of
255. This is a test for invidious sex discrimination under the equal protection clause,
established in cases where the discrimination was overtly based on gender.
256. See text accompanying notes 19-25. Eisenberg, supra note 166, at 54, 68, 73-79,
would require evidence of specific past discriminatory acts in order to invoke heightened
scrutiny. Otherwise Davis' concern about placing in jeopardy a broad range of tax, welfare
and regulatory programs is invoked.
257. See text accompanying notes 117-22.
258. See text accompanying note 211.
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factors relevant to the proof of intent corresponds to its regression to an
"atomistic" conception of challenged action. In the Court's view, the
challenged action is to be examined narrowly, in isolation from the
action's past, its future, and the rest of the context in which it occurs.2 "9
Justice Marshall hinted at this "atomistic" feature of the Court's
conceptual framework in referring to the Court's "singularly myopic
view of the facts established below. '260
C. Feeney's Monstrous Progeny
The implications of Feeney's regression to a subjective conception
of intent and an atomistic conception of an action are evident in two 1980
decisions, Mobile v. Bolden and Harris v. McRae. 26"' In Bolden, black
plaintiffs claimed that the at-large election of the city's governing
commission operated to dilute their voting strength, in violation of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 6 The Supreme Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit's affirmance of the district court's finding of a con-
stitutional violation, applying the Feeney version of the invidious
purpose requirement to alleged violations of the fifteenth as well as to
violations of the fourteenth amendment.263 Multi-member districts thus
are unconstitutional only if theirpurpose is invidiously to cancel out or
minimize minority voting strength. It is not enough that the system
adopted have the foreseeable effect of preventing the election of blacks;
the system must have been adopted for the purpose of preventing their
election. " ' According to Justice Stewart, plaintiffs' allegations of dis-
criminatory intent in Bolden were negated by the fact that blacks could
vote and run for office in Mobile without hindrance and by the fact that
blacks formed the only active slating organization in the city.265 Despite
the fact that no black had ever been elected to the commission even though
blacks comprised approximately 34.5% of the city's population, and
despite the fact that, because of bloc voting, it was highly unlikely that any
black could be elected under the at-large system, the Court found no
discriminatory purpose. 66 Justice Stewart's opinion rejected as simply
irrelevant to plaintiffs' claim the history of official discrimination against
blacks in Alabama,26' discrimination against blacks in municipal jobs
259. See text accompanying notes 98-100.
260. 442 U.S. at 286.
261. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bolden]; Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) [hereinafter cited as McRae].
262. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 58.
263. Id. at 61-63.
264. Id. at 71 n. 17.
265. Id. at 73.
266. Id. at 74.
267. Id.
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and services by the non-black elected officials,26 and the mechanics of an
electoral scheme (specifically, the size of the district and the requirement
of a majority vote) which tended to intensify its discriminatory effect on
the black voter. 269
Bolden, even more blatantly than Feeney, demonstrates the
Court's complete abandonment of both the Davis-Arlington Heights
totality of the circumstances approach and the Arlington Heights-Brest
formulae for inferring intent from objective, contextual factors. Instead,
Bolden established even more explicitly an approach whereby the
challenged state action is considered as an isolated event apart from both
its historical and its present social and political context."' Thus, Justice
White, the originator of the intent standard, pointed out in his Bolden
dissent that the Court had forsaken theDavis rule.' ,Davis, Justice White
argued, requires that discriminatory motive be proved from the totality of
objective factors making up the context of the challenged action or
institution. 2 Examples of these factors were those considered by the
district court in White pertaining to the cultural and economic realities of
the Mexican-American community on which the multi-member voting
268. Id. at 73-74.
269. Id.
270. Only four justices joined in this opinion. Id. at 58. Justice Blackmun concurred in
the result. Id. at 80. He felt that there was a showing of discrimination, but that the district
court went too far in the remedy, in substituting its idea of the proper form of government for
the form chosen by the citizens. Id. at 82-83. Justice Stevens concurred in the result, but
would reject the plurality's "intent" test in favor of a standard focusing on the system's
objective effect. Id. at 90-92. Under such a test, an official decision regarding voting districts
violates the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments if (1) it was manifestly not the product of a
routine or traditional political decision; (2) it had a significant adverse impact on a minority
group; and (3) if no neutral justification could be given for the decision, so that it was either
totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the political strength of the
affected minority group. Id at 90. The application of this test, however, does not indicate
unconstitutional discrimination in the instant case. The type of election system challenged is
widely used, so that the decision to adopt it was routine and capable of neutral justification.
The impact of the system was not to interfere with the voting rights of individuals, but only
with their political strength as a group. Justice Stevens would not have used too strict a
standard of invidious discrimination in relation to the effects of gerrymandering on groups,
since there is no constitutional right to proportional representation for particular groups.
Thus even though there was evidence that making it harder for blacks to be elected to city
offices was the motivation behind the decision to retain the Commission system, Justice
Stevens would have upheld that system. Id. at 86-87, 91-92.
The Commission system was thus upheld, even though only four Court members
agreed both that the subjective "discriminatory intent" test was appropriate and that no
discriminatory intent was shown. Two Court members felt that discriminatory motive was
shown, but concurred in the result: Justice Blackmun, because he felt that remand was
appropriate, and Justice Stevens, because he rejected the "motivation" test.
271. Id. at 102-03.
272. Id. at 103.
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districts were "overlaid."" ' 3 These same factors or types of factors were
considered by the district court in the instant case, and the facts it found
were "even more compelling" than those in White:27
By viewing each of the factors relied upon below in isolation, and
ignoring the fact that racial bloc voting makes it impossible to elect a
black commission under the at-large system, the plurality rejects the
'totality of the circumstances' approach . . . and leaves the courts
below adrift on uncharted seas with respect to how to proceed on
remand.?"
Justice Marshall, who did not dissent from the Davis-Arlington
Heights "discriminatory purpose" rule and who argued in Feeney only as
to the need forobjective indicia of intent, would have limited the use of the
discriminatory purpose rule. In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that
"discriminatory purpose" should not be a necessary condition for a
fifteenth amendment violation or for a violation of the "fundamental
rights" strand of fourteenth amendment cases. 276
If the discriminatory purpose rule is to apply to fifteenth amend-
ment cases, Justice Marshall would not have adopted the Feeney
standard, which is too "rigid" to be "appropriate," creating "a burden of
proof far too extreme to apply in vote-dilution cases." 277 Instead, he
would have used the foreseeability-burden-shifting rule suggested by
Justice Stevens in Davis and rejected by the Feeney Court. 278 Justice
Marshall ended his opinion with a strong condemnation of the Court's
equal protection doctrine as "bespeak[ing] an indifference to the plight of
minorities who, through no fault of their own, have suffered diminution of
273. Id.
274. Id. at 103.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 113-14. Since the right to vote is a substantive right which is explicitly
recognized by the Constitution under both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, the
reasons for the Davis rule do not apply to cases dealing with the infringement of this right
On the one hand, to utilize an impact test in these cases would not raise the spectre of court
interference with a wide range of governmental decisions in local welfare and regulatory
programs, as it would in cases dealing with the right to be free from discrimination in the
distribution of goods or services to which citizens are not constitutionally entitled. On the
other hand, the difficulties in proving motivation would allow infringement of the protected
right to vote. Id. at 113-15, 121, 134-35. Professor Ely feels that it is inappropriate to resort
to motive in such cases. Ely, supra note 165. at 1281-84; Ely, supra note 244 at 1160-
61.
277. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 136.
278. Id. at 137. This rule comports with Justice Marshall's own "sliding scale" approach
to the issue of the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny, according to which "the degree to
which the government must justify a decision depends upon the importance of the interests
infringed by it." Id. at 138, citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109-
10 (1973) (Marshall J. dissenting).
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the right preservative of all other rights:" 279
It is time to realize that manipulating doctrines and drawing
improper distinctions under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments . . . make this Court an accessory to the perpetuation of
racial discrimination. The plurality's requirement of proof of
intentional discrimination, so inappropriate in today's cases, may
represent an attempt to bury the legitimate concerns of the minority
beneath the soil of a doctrine almost as impermeable as it is
specious. 28
0
In McRae,2"' a decision which seems to represent a gender-based
version of the Dred Scott case2"2 or of Korematsu v. United States,28 3 the
Court applied the Feeney rule to reject an equal protection challenge to
the constitutionality of the Hyde amendment. 284 The Hyde amendment
prohibits the use of federal Medicaid funds to pay for abortions except
where the life of the mother would be endangered if the pregnancy were
carried to full term.28 5 Pregnancies which merely jeopardize the mother's
health, even to the point of reducing her ultimate life expectancy, are
included in the prohibition. 8 6 The district court found that the Hyde
amendment violates the equal protection rights of teenage women,
especially those aged seventeen and under, who are disproportionately
represented in the group of women for whom abortion is medically
necessary. 2 7
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justice
Stewart, chose to treat the district court's findings as involving an age
discrimination issue and applied the Feeney test to conclude that there
was no evidence that the statute was enacted because of its impact on
279. Id. at 135. Racially selective sympathy and indifference is conduct manifesting the
belief that the concerns of blacks are not worthy of the same degree of attention as those of
whites. Brest, supra note 204, at 7-8. According to Justice Marshall, "the decisions to
maintain multimember districting having obvious discriminatory effects represents, at the
very least, selective racial sympathy and indifference resulting in the frustration of minority
desires, the stigmatization of the minority as second-class citizens, and the perpetuation of
inhumanity." Bolden, 446 U.S. at 139.
280. Id. at 141.
281. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
282. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
283. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
284. McRae, 448 U.S. at 326.
285. The 1980 version of the amendment also excluded pregnancy due to rape or incest,
if reported promptly to law enforcement or public health service agencies. Id. at 302.
286. Examples of medical conditions which could result in such damage if aggravated by
pregnancy include phlebitis, diabetes, kidney disorders, cancer, sickle cell anemia,
rheumatic fever and heart disease. Id. at 339 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 353 n. 5 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
287. Id. at 323 n. 26.
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teenage women.28 Since poverty is not a suspect classification, Justice
Stewart argued that the challenged legislation need meet only the
"rational basis" level of scrutiny. '89 Because the statute is rationally
related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life
by encouraging childbirth, as opposed to abortion, through the use of
financial incentives except in the most extreme circumstances, it
withstood the "rational basis" level of scrutiny.29 Thus, it was not
irrational for the federal government to pay for other medically necessary
services and for childbirth but not for abortion, because only abortion is
the purposeful termination of a potential human life.291' The Court did not
discuss the issue of gender-based discrimination, although only women
have the need for abortion.292
The McRae Court applied the same "atomistic" thinking criticized
with respect to Feeney and Bolden to the claim that the Hyde amendment
infringed plaintiffs' due process right to freedom of personal choice with
regard to pregnancy recognized in Roe v. Wade. 93 The McRae majority
concluded that the amendment did not block women from seeking
abortions.2 94 Indigency may prevent women from receiving abortions,
the majority noted, but indigency is not an obstacle of the government's
making.29S The mother's freedom to choose abortion for personal reasons,
including preservation of her health, without criminal sanctions does not
imply the right to government funds for abortion. 296
Four justices registered separate dissents to the majority opinion.297
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent solely for the purpose of
pointing out that "[t] here is 'condescension' in the Court's holding that
'she may go elsewhere for her abortion'; this is 'disingenuous and alarm-
ing' . . . 'the Court either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize'
288. Id. at 323.
289. Id. at 323-24.
290. Id. at 324-25.
291. Id. at 325.
292. It can be expected, however, that if the issue had been raised it would have been
treated in the same way as Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See supra note 1. In
addition, the application of Feeney's "because of, not just in spite of' test presumably would
have produced the same results in a claim of gender-based discrimination. The idea was not
to disadvantage women by refusing to fund a medically necessary procedure, but just to
encourage childbirth. If men could get pregnant, they would be encouraged to bear children
instead of having abortions as well, and it is simply a contingent fact unrelated to the issue of
gender-based discrimination that only women can get pregnan!
293. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
294. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-17.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 315-18.
297. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, each of




the lot of the poorest among us.' . . . ",298 Justice Stevens called the
Court's equal protection analysis "sterile" in its exclusive focus on the
legitimate interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus "without
reference to the context in which that interest was held to be legitimate" in
Roe v. Wade. 99 Thus, the Court majority missed the point that a woman
cannot be denied a benefit to which she would otherwise be entitled solely
because of her exercise of a right declared to be constitutionally
protected.300 Justice Marshall pointed out what should have been obvious
to the Court majority: for the indigent woman attempting to exercise her
right to freedom of choice in procreative matters, there is no perceptible
difference between outright governmental prohibition of abortion and
failure to fund abortion while funding childbirth.30' Justice Marshall
would have looked at the immediate consequences of the governmental
action in the context as part of what the government did. Here the
immediate consequences are "a significant increase in the number of poor
women who will die or suffer significant health damage because of an
inability to procure necessary medical services."30
The dissenters also expressed dissatisfaction with the Court's equal
protection analysis, focusing on the appropriate level of review. Justice
Marshall criticized the Court's rigid "two-tiered" approach. 303 Instead,
Justice Marshall would impose a higher level of scrutiny on legislation
impacting politically powerless "discrete and insular minorities" such as
poor women. 0' Justices Brennan and Blackmun agreed that the statute
calls for heightened scrutiny because it affects only a politically powerless
segment of society: that group of women least able to defend their Roe v.
Wade privacy rights against the "political majority's judgment of the
morally acceptable and socially desirable preference on a sensitive and
intimate decision that the Constitution entrusts to the individual."30 5 For
298. Id. at 348-49.
299. Id. at 350-52.
300. Id. at 352.
301. Id. at 347.
302. Id. at 338. The dissenters also argued that the statute does not survive even the
"rational basis" test. It does not serve a legitimate state interest because its purpose is to
discourage the exercise of a constitutionally protected choice. Id. at 330-36, 354-56. It is not
rationally related to preserving fetal life, since it prohibits abortion even in cases in which the
mother's medical condition will lead to the death, deformity, or shortened life expectation of
the fetus. Id. at 339-40. And it is not rationally related to the purposes of the Medicaid
program as a health scheme for the poor, since childbirth (especially with complications) is
more expensive than abortion, and since the result of the amendment will be not to treat
medical conditions where the treatment would result in terminating the pregnancy. Id. at
330-32, 355-56.
303. Id. at 342.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 332.
1983]
Law and Inequality
Justice Marshall, heightened scrutiny is also appropriate if the group
affected has experienced a history of discrimination. Here, minority
women are disproportionately represented in the affected group: non-
white women obtain abortions at nearly double the rate of whites.1°6
Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" model of appropriate scrutiny also
considers the importance of the governmental benefits denied. Here the
benefits at issue" 'are of absolutely vital importance in the lives of the
recipients.' "30
Justice Stevens wrote that"[this case] . . . illustrates the flaw in
the method of equal protection analysis by which one chooses among
alternative 'levels of scrutiny' "first, and only then judges the appro-
priate means-end relationship.30 8 "That method may simply bypass the
real issue'-that of determining the weight to be attached to the
competing claims for class inclusion or exclusion.30 9 Here the plaintiffs'
claim to inclusion in the class of Medicaid recipients more than outweighs
the government's interest in excluding plaintiffs, because Roe v. Wade
gave greater priority to protecting the mother's health and the individual's
freedom of choice than to protecting fetal life. 10
The dissenting justices' vitriolic attack in these two cases clearly
indicates the bankruptcy of the Court's motive test for determining
whether government action which disadvantages women and minorities
will invoke heightened scrutiny. Justice White, the originator of the
motive test, rejected it in its McRae form because it is virtually impossible
to prove motivation under the "subjective," "Cartesian" conception of
intent." As Justice Marshall's dissent pointed out, when this conception
is combined with the narrow, atomistic conception of an action, the test
becomes a cynical device used to deny recognition of injustices to
traditionally oppressed groups in the name of federalism and other
principles of limited government.31 '
D. Later Developments
The discriminatory intent cases of the 1981 and 1982 terms display
contradictory and confusing statements concerning the definition of the
motive standard and procedures for its application. They reveal as well
the inconsistency of the standard's results and a willingness on the part of
306. Id. at 343.
307. Id. at 341-43.
308. Id. at 352 n. 4.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 327-29.
312. "Ultimately the result reached today may be traced to the Court's unwillingness to
apply the constraints of the Constitution to decisions involving the expenditure of
governmental funds." Id. at 347.
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the conservative justices to change the standard in order to achieve a
politically desired result. In addition, the cases seem to indicate a decline
in the significance of the standard as a test for deciding equal protection
cases. Cases are now being decided primarily on other grounds.
1. Does Intent Matter?
InMichaelM. v. Sonoma County Superior Court"' the Court, in a
5-4 decision, upheld California's "statutory rape" law making it a crime
for a male to have sexual intercourse with a female under 18 unless she is
his wife.3 14 Defendant had challenged the statute on equal protection
grounds, since no comparable statute makes it illegal for a female to
"accomplish" an act of sexual intercourse with a male under 18. Since the
case involved an overt gender-based classification, it did not turn
primarily on the issue of discriminatory purpose, but rather on the issue
of whether the challenged classification withstood the intermediate level
of review. 3
However, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rejected the
dissent's claim that the statute's purpose when passed in 1859-to
protect the virtue and chastity of young women- is unjustifiable because
it rests on archaic stereotypes." ' He cited the rule of O'Brien,3' stating
that, even if this were one of the statute's motives, the Court will not strike
down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an allegedly illicit
legislative motive. 318 Given the history of the"motive" requirement in the
Court's equal protection cases since O'Brien, this argument betrays a
cynical willingness on the Court's part to manipulate doctrine in order to
achieve a desired result." 9
2. Who Decides Whether There Was Discriminatory Intent?
In City of Memphis v. Green, 320 black citizens had challenged the
city's closing of a street through an affluent white neighborhood. The
closing had caused traffic to the city center from black neighborhoods to
313. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
314. Id. at 466.
315. Id. at 468-69.
316. Id. at 472 n.7.
317. 391 U.S. 367 (1948).
318. 450 U.S. at 472 n.7.
319. Furthermore, the outmoded stereotype suggested by defendant and the dissenters
as the statute's true purpose is just what the Court's "protection of young women from the
consequences of sexual intercourse" rationale boils down to. This becomes more apparent
when the Court rejected as "ludicrous" defendant's argument that if the purpose of the
statute is really to prevent pregnancy, it is impermissably overbroad in its inclusion of
intercourse with prepubescent females. Id. at 475.
320. 451 U.S. 100 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Memphis].
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the north to be diverted."' Plaintiffs claimed that the city's action violated
42 U.S.C. § 1982 and the thirteenth amendment..' The closing was
effected by the erection of a barrier at the point of separation between the
black and white neighborhoods. It was a unique step, not part of a uniform
city planning effort, taken at the request of white property owners who
expressed concern about excess traffic and danger to children.3"3 One
person soliciting signatures for a petition in favor of the street closing had
referred to the traffic as "undesirable traffic. 3
2 4
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's finding of a
violation.2 5 Justice Stevens' opinion "inexplicably"'1 6 re-examined the
facts which formed the basis for the holding in light of the record, even to
the extent of making factual findings not made by either the district court
or the court of appeals327 concerning the significance of the inconvenience
to black citizens. The district court's finding of no discriminatory intent
was upheld against suggestions to the contrary by the court of appeals, on
the basil of the concerns expressed by residents and city council
members about traffic."' The Court refused to probe beneath the surface
of the residents' expressed purposes, asserting that because the plaintiffs
had sued the mayor and city council, it is the latter's motivation that must
be ascertained. 29 The Court similarly refused to hold that the history of
resistance to desegregation in Memphis, the fact that the white neigh-
borhood in question developed as a result of pre-World War II segrega-
tion, and evidence of present racial animus required the district court to
find that the city council's action was racially motivated, since there was
no showing that "the residents of Hein Park would have welcomed the
heavy flow of transient traffic through their neighborhood if the drivers
had been predominantly white."'' 0 Thus, the Feeney test is alive and well
with the assistance of some independent fact finding by the Supreme
Court: the Court defers to the district court's factual determination of no
discriminatory intent, but only after it has assisted the district court in
finding those facts.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, argued that the evidence produced at
trial met the Arlington Heights requirement for proof of discriminatory
321. Id. at 103.
322. Id. at 102.
323. Id. at 104.
324. Id. at 115.
325. Id. at 129.
326. Id. at 130 (White, J., concurring).
327. Id. at 110.
328. Id. at 113-16.
329. Id. at 114-15.
330. Id. at 116 n. 27.
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intent."' It was clear that the "undesirability" of the traffic referred to the
fact that it was predominantly black; the city had deviated from its usual
procedures in processing applications for street closings in not requiring
that the application be signed by all homeowners of abutting property,
there was no notice to black homeowners and only minimal opportunity
for them to speak at the council meetings; the action was unique in the
history of the city, and all parties were aware of the symbolic significance
of the action's disparate racial impact, given the city's history of racial
segregation.33 2 These were precisely the types of factors whichArlington
Heights had indicated were relevant to the proof of discriminatory
intent.333 That they were not determinative here indicates that the
Arlington Heights totality of circumstances approach is moribund.
In 1982, however, there was a strange new development. In
Pullman-Standard v. Swint,"' the Court held that the question of
whether the differential impact of a seniority system reflected intentional
discrimination under section 703(h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is a
pure question of fact, subject to review only according to the "clearly
erroneous" standard.335
Shortly thereafter, the Court decided Rogers v. Lodge, 36 a case
very similar to Bolden. This time the Court upheld the court of appeals'
affirmance of the district court's findings of discriminatory intent in the
maintenance of an at-large multi-member electoral system in Burke
County, Georgia33 because Swint required that the clearly erroneous
standard be applied to the trial court's finding.313 In addition, as Justice
White's opinion pointed out, the factors considered by the district court 39
331. Id. at 141.
332. Id. at 141-44.
333. Id. at 141.
334. 456 U.S. 273 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Swint].
335. Rule 52 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedures. Id. at 1788-89. In so holding, the
Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's rule that a finding of discrimination is a question of
"ultimate fact," subject to independent determination by the reviewing court. Id. at
1788.
336. 102 S.Ct. 3272 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Lodge].
337. Id. at 3278-79.
338. Swint, 456 U.S. at 287.
339. These factors included the fact that no black had even been elected to county offices
and a series of indicia that blacks had less opportunity to participate in the political
processes than whites: the history. of previous discrimination against blacks and its adverse
effect on voter registration; discrimination against blacks in education; exclusion of blacks
from participation in Democratic Party processes; past and present discrimination in the
selection of grand jurors, the hiring of county employees, and appointments to the county
governing boards and committees; the unresponsiveness of county officials to black
interests and the need for services in the black community, the county's reluctance to
enforce desegregation; county assistance to an all-white private school; and the depressed
socio-economic status of county blacks as a result of past discrimination. In addition, the
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were the same as those considered in White v. Regester, where the Court
also had found it appropriate to defer to the district court's " 'local
appraisal of the design and impact of the . . . multimember district in
the light of past and present reality, political and otherwise.' "340 Thus,
the totality of circumstances approach was resuscitated under the guise of
deference to district court fact finding.
As the dissent in Lodge pointed out, however, the factors con-
sidered by the district court were the very same factors considered by the
district court in Bolden and rejected by the Supreme Court.' 4 ' Justice
White was unable to explain satisfactorily the difference in result between
the two cases. 42
The conservative dissenters all criticized the decision for in-
appropriately delving into the subjective motivations of local officials,' 4 1
although this is precisely what the Feeney test requires. Justice Stevens,
noting the reservations expressed in his Davis concurrence, argued that
the intent standard is ephemeral and judicially unmanageable, making
the constitutionality of the institution depend not on its structure, but on
such changing and extraneous factors as the motivations of politicians
operating with regard to population shifts and voting patterns." 4 Stevens
would now have adopted Justice Marshalrs position in Bolden, that it is
inappropriate to apply an intent standard to the distribution of con-
stitutionally protected interests.14 He cited Professor Karst's argument
that the motive standard is inadequate to protect black citizens from
unconstitutional conduct 46 and stressed the ascertainability and dis-
utility objections"1 to the motive test. He would, however, have looked at
district court considered features of the at-large system which enhanced the tendency of
multi-member districts to minimize the voting strength of racial minorities: the size of the
county, the majority vote requirement and the requirement that candidates run for specific
seats combined with the absence of a residency requirement. Lodge, 102 S.Ct. at 3279-
81.
340. Id. at 3278.
341. Id. at 3281-82 (Powell, J., dissenting).
342. Id. The plurality in Mobile had rejected the district court's finding because it had
relied on the factors specified in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Zimmer], decided before the discriminatory intent standard was
articulated by the Court. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 71. The district court in Lodge relied on these
same factors. However, Justice White rejected the argument that it therefore used the wrong
legal standard for the reasons set forth in Bolden. This was because the district court referred
to the discriminatory intent standard for vote dilution cases set forth in Nevett v. Sides, 571
F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978), and because it recognized that it was not limited to a consideration
of theZimmer factors but was to consider the totality of the circumstances. Lodge, 102 S.Ct.
at 3277-78. The argument is strained: Justice White had felt that in Bolden the district court
had relied appropriately on the Zimmer factors. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 101.
343. Lodge, 102 S.Ct. at 3282.
344. Id. at 3283.
345. Id. at 3290.
346. Karat, supra note 245; Lodge, 102 S.Ct. at 3290 n. 28.
347. Lodge, 102 S.Ct. at 3290-92. See text accompanying notes 141-43 & note 183.
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the reasons or purposes for legislative action, as judged by the "cus-
tomary indicia of legislative intent .... [t] he formal proceedings of
the legislature and its committees, the effect of the measure as evidenced
by its text, the historical setting in which it was enacted, and the public
acts and deeds of its sponsors and opponents.' 4 Here the record was
inadequate to permit determination of the validity of the county
governmental structure on the basis of traditional subjective stan-
dards.349
Justices Powell and Rehnquist would not have abandoned the
subjective intent standard in determining a vote-dilution case under the
fourteenth amendment.3"' They agreed, however, with Justice Stevens
that the inquiry into intent should be focused on "objective" factors which
are judicially manageable and should avoid "deeply subjective inquiries
into the motivations of local officials in structuring local governments."'I
In this connection, they too cited Professor Karst's 1978 rejection of the
motive test." 2 They would have reversed in Lodge because "the factors
cited by the court of appeals are too attenuated as a matter of law to
support an inference of discriminatory intent.""'3
This shift by the conservative justices is a remarkable develop-
ment. In Feeney, the conservative justices explicitly adopted a "deeply
subjective" standard of discriminatory intent, a narrow standard under
which intent is very difficult to ascertain. Yet when the district court in
Lodge found intent on the basis of objective indicia, the conservative
justices labeled this finding "subjective," and would have opted for
something "objective." Moreover, in criticizing the district court's
finding in Lodge, the conservative justices cited Professor Karst, who
rejected the motive test altogether. But the "objective" indicia which the
conservative justices had in mind, unlike the indicia in White, are such as
will not lead to invalidation of challenged governmental action. Instead,
as Memphis indicates, the conservative justices would now look no
further than legislators' statements. 114 This inquiry yields no test of intent
at all and is diametrically opposed to Professor Karst's position, which
criticized the motive test as inadequate to protect the rights of minor-
ities.
348. Lodge, 102 S.Ct. at 3290 n. 28.
349. Id. at 3290-91.
350. Id. at 3282.
351. Id.
352. Id.; see Karst, supra note 245.
353. Lodge, 102 S.Ct. at 3383.
354. Memphis,451 U.S. at 114-15. Other indications of this approach are to be found in
Justice Rehnquist's dissents in Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776; Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick,
443 U.S. at 509-10, and in his majority opinion in Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ.,
102 S.Ct. 3211 (1982).
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Finally, in two school desegregation cases decided shortly after
Swint and Lodge, the Court's principle of deference to the fact finder on
the issue of discriminatory intent led to inexplicably opposite con-
clusions3" in markedly similar factual situations. Washington v. Seattle
School District No. 1" and Crawford v. Board of Education"5 7 both
involved equal protection challenges to state initiatives outlawing busing
for desegregation. Both cases turned primarily not on the issue of whether
the propositions were enacted with a discriminatory motive, but on the
issue of whether the initiatives involved explicit racial classifica-
tions.'"
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Crawford, citing Reitman v.
Mulkey359 for the proposition that deference is owed to a lower court's
finding concerning the circumstances surrounding the passage and
impact of state legislation,3 60 all but disavowed the motive test. The
California Court of Appeals found that claims alleging voters were
motivated by a discriminatory purpose were based on "pure specula-
tion, '" a finding based on nothing more than the stated purposes of the
amendment itself.3 62 Implicitly recognizing that such a lower court
finding does not warrant deference, the Supreme Court instead went on to
speculate itself as to what could have motivated the voters. According to
Justice Powell, voters were presumably motivated by concern over the
adverse effects on a school system of" 'the pursuit of racial balance at
any cost.' ",363 Adopting this speculation, the Court then argued that the
benefits of neighborhood schooling are racially neutral and that minority
voters supported Proposition I.16 Paradoxically, in this context, the
Court cited Justice Stevens' Davis criticism of the motive test as a
355. On both the issue of discriminatory intent and on the underlying equal protection
claim.
356. 102 S.Ct. 3187 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Seattle].
357. 102 S.Ct. 3211 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Crawford].
358. Seattle, 102 S.Ct. at 3193-95; Crawford, 102 S.Ct. at 3217-18.
359. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
360. Crawford, 102 S.Ct. at 3221. In Reitman, the Supreme Court deferred to the
California Supreme Court. 387 U.S. at 376. In Crawford, the Court deferred to the most
conservative panel of the California Court of Appeals which, as Justice Marshall pointed
out, "affirms a factual determination that was never made" on the issue of discriminatory
intent. 102 S.Ct. at 3231.
361. Crawford, 102 S.Ct. at 3221.
362. The stated purposes were to conserve funds, protect student health and safety,
maximize educational opportunities, enhance parental participation in the eduational
process, conserve fuel, protect the environment, and preserve harmony and tranquility in
the state and its public schools. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 654-55,
170 CaL Rptr. 495, 509 (1980).
363. Crawford, 102 S.Ct. at 3221.
364. Id.
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sufficient condition for invalidation of challenged state action. 36 Thus, in
Crawford the principle of deference to the lower court produces a result in
which no serious consideration was given to the issue of whether the
challenged action derives from discriminatory motive.
In Seattle, on the other hand, the Court concluded that "it is beyond
reasonable doubt . . . that the [challenged state action] . . .was
enacted 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of its adverse effects upon"
busing for integration, and thus was effectively drawn for racial pur-
poses,366 because the district court and court of appeals had found that the
initiative was addressed to a racial issue.36' In support of this conclusion,
the Court pointed to sponsors' statements emphasizing the fact that the
challenged initiative prohibited busing only for purposes of desegrega-
tion3 68 and concluded that neither the courts nor the initiative's sponsors
"had any difficulty perceiving the racial nature of the issue settled by
[the] Initiative ... ,69
Since these two cases are distinguishable only by the fact that there
was a lower court finding of discriminatory motive in Seattle, but not in
Crawford, the standards applied by the lower courts now appear to be
irrelevant. The state action challenged in Crawford, like the initiative
challenged in Seattle, explicitly addressed only busing for integration. In
addition, voters in each case had no difficulty recognizing the racial
nature of the proposed state action. We are thus left without guidance as to
the proper test for discriminatory intent.
Accordingly, the current status of the motive test is ambiguous. If
the Court now intends simply to defer to the lower courts without any
examination of the lower court's rationale, it is likely that the motive test
will diminish in importance. Recent statements by some of the con-
servative justices casting doubt on the wisdom of having a motive test at
all support this prognostication.1 0 When it applies the test at all, the
Court now vacillates widely in its definition of the standard. For the
conservative justices, the test has gone from an objective, totality of
circumstances test to a subjective, inner event of "mental aiming" test,
and finally, back to an objective but positivistic refusal to look beyond the
legislators' statements themselves, in Memphis and Crawford. One is
left with the strong suspicion that the Court's motive is simply to avoid
finding equal protection violations against women and minorities.
365. Id. at 3221 n. 30.
366. Seattle, 102 S.Ct. at 3195-96.
367. Id. at 3192-93.
368. Id. at 3195. This fact also triggered the application of the rule of Hunter Y. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1968) and Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F.Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970). summarily
affd, 402 U.S. 395 (1971), on the basis of which the Court upheld the district court finding
that the initiative restructured the political processes along racial lines.
369. Seattle, 102 S.Ct. at 3195.
370. See text accompanying notes 343-44.
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Conclusion: What Should Be the Test
of an Equal Protection Violation?
What Kind of Motive Test: Subjective or Objective?
For the reasons argued extensively throughout this article, if a
motive or intent test is to be adopted, it should be an objective test, which
permits examination of the entire historical and social context of the
action. To eliminate the role of impact in the proof of intent is to render the
concept of intent useless as a test of discrimination.
Should Discriminatory Purpose Be a Necessary Condition for an Equal
Protection Violation?
Proof of discriminatory purpose should not be a necessary
condition of an equal protection violation. Impact, not intent, is the
crucial factor. The primary concern of the equal protection clause must be
with what is in fact done to protected groups by state agencies. While the
reasons why it was done may be a factor entering into the description of
what was done, such reasons are not the only factors to be considered in
determining how the action is to be described. In many circumstances,
the harm is just as great if done for "benign" reasons as for malevolent
ones, and in any case this harm requires remedy regardless of the reasons
that it occurred. Thus, in Feeney, the state's motivation of rewarding
veterans is irrelevant to the question of whether the near total exclusion of
women from important state civil service jobs is constitutionally justified
or requires a remedy. Similarly, cases in which invidious motivation is
impossible to prove militate against relying exclusively on motivation as
the criterion for remedying race and gender-based harms. This is not to
say that the equal protection clause is violated whenever a state action
adversely affects minorities or women. Significant adverse impact on
disenfranchised groups should shift the burden of justification to the
defendant in the same way that overt racial or gender-based classifi-
cations do.
Should Motivation Be Irrelevant?
The argument that motive should not be a necessary condition of
unconstitutionality leaves open the question of whether motivation
should be a sufficient condition of unconstitutionality, or onefactor to be
considered. As a first approach, recall Palmer. Assuming that the adverse
effects were equal for blacks and whites, should the city's decision be
unconstitutional because the motive was to avoid integration? It seems
intuitively clear that the decision should be invalidated: motive does
matter. But why does it matter?
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Professor Brest suggests two reasons."' The first reason recalls the
"ordinary language" analysis of motive in Section I of this article."' A
motive is a hidden, forbidden purpose. Overt discrimination on the basis
of race violates the fourteenth amendment, unless the requirements of
"strict scrutiny" are met. Thus, in Palmer, the city is prohibited from
operating overtly segregated swimming pools. It would also be prohibited
from operating swimming pools which were segregated in fact, but where
some other ostensible basis is advanced as a pretext. If, then, the city is
prohibited from closing the swimming pools because of opposition to
integration, it is also prohibited from closing them for pretextual
reasons-such as economy and safety-which simply disguise opposi-
tion to integration. Disadvantaging a racial group is a constitutionally
prohibited objective; therefore, it cannot be pursued covertly, under
cover of a permissable pretext, any more than it can be pursued
overtly.
If discriminatory motive violates the equal protection clause in
cases such as this, then we would have an "either/or" test: either
discriminatory impact or discriminatory motive may be the basis for
finding an equal protection violation in appropriate circumstances. Of
course, in some cases both motive and impact can be established.
Professor Brest's second argument suggests a different approach.
Pointing out that consideration of illicit motives may determine the
outcome of an official decision, Brest argues that an individual has the
right not to be disadvantaged by a decision which would not have been
adopted but for the consideration of illicit objectives." 3 Brest's is
essentially a causation argument. Causation is a relationship between
two events or factors: the cause and its effect, whereby the former
ostensibly brings about the latter. In our case, the effect is harm to
minority group members; the cause, the illicit motivation. Thus, Brest's
main argument against a discriminatory motivation test is that it
produces harmful results, one of which is stigmatization of minority
group members. This causal test thus combines motive and impact.""
371. Brest, supra note 75, at 115-16.
372. See text accompanying notes 171-72.
373. In a 1976 article Professor Brest articulates his "anti-discrimination principle"
prohibiting race-dependent decisions and conduct. Brest, supra note 204. This principle
prevents unfair infliction of injury based on irrational assumptions with respect to the
comparative worth of racial groups through two basic objectives: preventing harmful results
which depend upon consideration of race, and guarding against "defects in process." Id. at
6-7.
374. This is seen by analyzing Brest's concept of a"race dependent decision": the idea is that
consideration of race produced the decision. This suggests that the "motive or impact"
dilemma might be solved by adapting a test of invidious discrimination which combines the
two. To do this is to abolish the de facto-de jure distinction, as suggested by Justice Douglas
inKeves. 413 U.S. at 215-16 (Douglas, J., concurring), Justice Powell, also in Keyes, 413
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Professor Brest also suggests a third argument, distinguishing a
law's "operative rule" from its objectives and effects."' The "operative
rule" is what the law or governmental decision prescribes; Brest points
out that a covert operative rule which classifies by race is just as illicit or
suspect as an overt operative rule based on race.37 6 A law whose overt
operative rule is neutral, but which covertly classifies on the basis of race,
however, is a law which is racially motivated: racial classifications are the
true, though hidden, explanation of what the law is doing. Brest's main
argument for the unconstitutionality of racially motivated government
action is based on its unjust or harmful effects. But laws whose operative
principles are covertly based on race are unconstitutional regardless of
their effects. Here we are embroiled in the confusion about "motive"
noted in Section I: " ' "motivation" can refer to the aimed atpurposes of
the decisionmaker, the reasons why the decisionmaker acted as it did,
what caused the decisionmaker to act as it did, or any hidden, nefarious,
factor which explains an untoward action. Sometimes many of these
factors are the same in explaining a given action; sometimes they are
different. Where the covert operative rule of a decision is race, we have a
case of illicit motivation in which the "motive" is different from the law's
purpose and effects. Thus, it is not simply that the aimed at goal is covertly
race or gender-based: as in Seattle, the law itself actually classifies
covertly on the basis of race or gender. As such, the law violates the equal
protection rights of those subject to it regardless of its purpose and
regardless of its effects. 37'
Should the De Facto-De Jure Distinction Be Abolished?
Professor Eisenberg also advocates a form of "causation" test to
handle cases where it is not possible to establish intentional discrimi-
nation. Under Eisenberg's principle, governmental action resulting in
disproportionate impact on a protected group would invoke heightened
scrutiny whenever such impact is "reasonably attributable to race."37 9
"Reasonably attributable to" is a causal principle which he would define
U.S. at 224 (PoweL J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and by Justice Stevens,
see discussion supra note 288.
375. Brest, supra note 75, at 103-05.
376. Id. at 116-18.
377. See text accompanying notes 172-74.
378. This is analogous to "deontological" arguments for the morality or immorality of
actions or rules. According to deontological theories, the moral rightness or wrongness of an
action does not depend on its consequence but is a function of the nature of the action itself.
See, e.g., Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals 21, 44 (1969); W.D.
Ross, The Right and the Good (1922).
379. See Eisenberg, supra note 166, at 40, 62.
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in terms of the tort law tests of "cause in fact" and "proximate cause. "3 s°
Thus, Eisenberg advocates an "intermediate" principle in betweenpure
impact and the "motive only" rule of Davis and Feeney. If the
disproportionate impact can be causally traced to prior race-dependent
decisions of the state agency, and if the causal link is a"proximate" one in
terms of contiguity in time, place, and subject matter, then a form of
heightened (but not necessarily strict) scrutiny is invoked. On this level of
scrutiny, noncompelling governmental interests can be considered as
well. The causal principle thus permits a "balancing" approach where the
governmental interests are balanced against the concerns of the impacted
minority. This approach provides more flexibility than under traditional
"strict scrutiny" or under Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach: not
all racial classifications need be treated in the same manner because the
Court can consider the degree of disproportionate impact and the area of
plaintiffs' injury."'
Professor Eisenberg's approach is a good one. The causal principle
allows the consideration of the same contextual factors advocated above
as essential ingredients for proof of motivation. This article has stressed
that if a motive test is adopted, the context of the challenged action and its
foreseeable impact must be considered essential ingredients in any
determination of motivation .32 Eisenberg's test considers these factors.
Thus, it does not matter if the factors are labeled "motive" or "impact";
what matters is that they are the factors that should be considered in
assessing equal protection claims. Eisenberg would also utilize consider-
ation of motive where disproportionate impact could not be clearly
established.3"3 Finally, this approach rejects the Court's "either/or"
gyrations in favor of permitting consideration of both motive and impact
factors in assessing equal protection claims.
380. Id. at 57-59.
381. Id. at 58-73.
382. The purely "subjective" standard of Feeney and Bolden is almost useless as a test of
discriminatory intent, for it allows the state agency to do anything and say that it had a good
motive so long as there issome evidence supporting its claim of licit motivation. That is, the
subjective conception of intent is not consistent with Arlington Heights' rejection of the
"dominant purpose" rule. As seen in the results of Memphis and Crawford, it thus provides
virtually no protection against discrimination which does not declare itself on the face of the
statute or policy.
383. Id. at 102-105.
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